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RAPE, LIES AND VIDEOTAPE
Robert Garcia *
I. INTRODUCTION
A six-minute scene from the film Last Tango in Paris makes it possi-
ble to explore law, lawyering, and interpretations of sex and violence:
What is rape? What is acceptable behavior between men and women in
bed? How should the crime of rape be defined? What do social attitudes
about gender roles, race and ethnicity, class and women's credibility have
to do with rape? What is the relationship between values, facts, evidence,
law and lawyering? How do we think about these issues in the court-
room, in the classroom and in legal scholarship?
In the spring of 1991, the students in my seminar on sex and vio-
lence did an exercise involving the scene from Last Tango in Paris.1 The
scene depicts a sexual encounter between a man and a woman in an
apartment. Two people watched the scene and played the role of wit-
nesses. Two students in the seminar who had not seen the film played
the role of lawyers, one as the prosecutor and one as the defense attorney
for the man. Each lawyer prepared and presented the testimony of one
witness on direct examination, and cross-examined the other witness.
Each witness truthfully described what he or she saw and heard, as if he
or she had witnessed the scene from a neighboring apartment. The gov-
ernment witness was a woman, and the defense witness was a man. Both
lawyers were women. The remaining students, who had not seen the
film, were then asked to decide whether the man raped the woman.
Based on the testimony, the students concluded that any claim of rape
was unfounded. The students then watched the scene for the first time.
* Acting Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles, School of Law; B.A.,
1974, Stanford University; J.D., 1978, Stanford Law School.
I presented an earlier version of this piece at the Evidence Conference of the Association
of American Law Schools (AALS) at the University of Iowa College of Law on June 8, 1991.
Thanks to many people, including Peter Arenella, Paul Bergman, David Binder, Carole
Goldberg-Ambrose, Willy Forbath, Ken Graham, Joel Handler, Chris Littleton, Leon Letwin,
Jerry L6pez, Chris Mueller, Lucie White and Steve Yeazell; to Doug Gravelle, Lizbeth Parker,
Elaine Stroeber and Matt Swafford; and to the students in my seminar on sex and violence.
1. LAST TANGO IN PARIS (Produzioni Europee Associate 1972). The movie was directed
by Bernardo Bertolucci and stars Marlon Brando and Maria Schneider. The seminar covered
sexual homicide (a killing where the person kills the object of his or her desire), Battered
Woman Syndrome, postpartum disorders and infanticide, rape and Rape Trauma Syndrome.
For a transcript of the scene, see infra note 180 and accompanying text.
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Based on the film clip, all the students agreed beyond a reasonable doubt
that the man raped the woman.
The purpose of the exercise was to explore rape, criminal law, evi-
dence, professional responsibility and lawyering, in the context of trying
to solve a realistically complex legal and social problem.' In some re-
spects, the exercise was a simulation of the testimony in a rape trial. The
simulation, however, was only an incidental part of the exercise. More
importantly, the exercise was quite real: the witnesses truthfully de-
scribed what they saw and heard.3 The students actually had to decide
whether the man raped the woman, first on the basis of the testimony,
and then on the basis of the film clip.
Did the man rape the woman? Is there a correct answer to that
question? Did the students get it right when they concluded that the
claim of rape was unfounded? Did they get it right when they concluded
that the man raped the woman? If the man did rape the woman, why
was it so difficult to prove?
Many people believe that there are objective facts out there in the
real world. If we could simply figure out "what really happened," we
would know the answer to relevant legal questions. If we knew "what
really happened" between a man and a woman, we would know whether
the man raped the woman. Witnesses describe "what really happened"
outside the courtroom. The jury reconstructs that historical reality on
the basis of the evidence at trial. The legal consequences follow when the
jury applies the law to the so-called facts. The "statement of facts" in an
2. See generally Anthony G. Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education-A 21st Century Per-
spective, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 612 (1984) (discussing clinical education's attempts to go beyond
traditional case and doctrinal analysis, and to provide students with method of learning from
experience); Gerald P. L6pez, Training Future Lawyers to Work with the Politically and So-
cially Subordinated: Antigeneric Legal Education, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 305 (1989) (suggesting
what is wrong with legal education and how to change it).
3. Each witness was instructed, in substance, as follows: "You are about to watch a scene
from a movie. Assume you are who you are. You are in Paris. Through your window, you
see and hear the following events take place in the apartment next door." Each witness then
watched the film clip alone. Each was then instructed, in substance: "Someone will be asking
you some questions. You should answer truthfully all questions about what you saw and
heard."
I did not know what either witness would say. I arbitrarily assigned the first witness to
the prosecutor, and the second witness to the defense attorney. The examinations were con-
ducted under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The defense attorney heard the government's
witness for the first time on direct. The prosecutor did not know there was a second witness
until he testified. The attorneys did not make opening statements or closing arguments. In
discussions afterwards, the government witness said she felt the man raped the woman. The
defense witness felt the man did not rape the woman. The preparation of the witnesses and the
testimony were not videotaped. In future seminars, the preparation and the testimony will be
taped, and the class will analyze the tapes as part of the exercise.
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appellate opinion summarizes what happened. Law professors speak and
write about the "facts" in a rape case, as if we could tell what the "facts"
were by reading an appellate opinion.4 This Article explores those
assumptions.
Last Tango brought a new level of realism to the movies. The scene
provides a rich opportunity for examining how sex and violence, and the
relations between men and women, are depicted in the movies. The por-
trayal of sex and violence in the movies reflects and helps define what is
acceptable behavior between men and women in real life.5 More impor-
tantly, the scene serves as a mirror that reflects the values of the people
who watch and describe it.
Part of the problem in deciding whether a man raped a woman is
that something gets lost (or added) when "what really happened" is
translated into words through the testimony of witnesses. Another part
of the problem is that "what really happened" involves not only the ex-
ternal actions between the man and the woman, but also their internal
thoughts and emotions: Did the man intend to rape the woman? Did
the woman feel raped? In addition, even if we know "what really hap-
pened"-by watching a film clip, for example-it may be difficult to de-
cide whether that was a rape, unless we first decide what should count as
rape.
Rape is not just a legal problem. Rape is a social problem. The law
is only one tool for trying to solve the underlying social problem. In
addition, rape is not simply a descriptive issue. Rape is also a normative
issue. Different people have different perspectives on what constitutes
rape. Whether the man raped the woman depends on the values, beliefs,
attitudes and biases of the people describing the event, and of the people
deciding the question. How many layers of interpretation are involved in
4. Cf. Charles R. Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Accepta-
bility of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1357, 1360-61 (1985) (to be socially acceptable, verdicts
must be interpreted as statements about what happened, not as statements about evidence at
trial).
5. See Robin Warshaw, Ugly Truths of Date Rape Elude the Screen, N.Y. TIMEs, May 5,
1991, § 2, at 17 (depiction of acquaintance rapes in movies reflects and reinforces beliefs that
rape occurs only between strangers, that women want to be raped, that women fall in love with
their rapists, and that some women deserve to be raped); see also William Grimes, Buried
Themes: Psychoanalyzing Movies, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 23, 1991, at B1 (applying psychoanalysis
to films of Bertolucci and others). See generally Neil M. Malamuth, Sexually Violent Media,
Thought Patterns, and Antisocial Behavior, 2 PUB. COMM. & BEHAV. 159 (1989) (synthesis of
empirical studies which suggest that (1) sexual violence in media is one of many social forces
that could affect person's thought patterns (e.g., attitudes, beliefs, perceptions and schemas)
supporting sexual aggression, along with other cultural forces and individual experiences; (2)
such thought patterns could in turn contribute to aggression against women, including rape;
and (3) more research is needed).
April 1992]
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describing the scene from Last Tango? How many layers of interpreta-
tion are involved in a real rape case? What values are reflected in each
interpretation? How are those values shaped? Whose interpretations
matter, and why? What can a lawyer do about those interpretations?
This Article will examine the question of whether the man raped the
woman in the scene from Last Tango from several different perspectives.
It will focus primarily on the perspective of a trial lawyer. For example,
a prosecutor investigating a rape case must address a series of issues: "Is
that a rape? What do the witnesses say? How is rape defined under the
criminal law? What will the defense be? Who's the judge? Who's on the
jury? Will a conviction stick on appeal?" Generally, it is the prosecutor
who tries to prove that a rape occurred, and the defense attorney who
tries to discredit that claim. However, the question of whether the man
raped the woman is not as simple as being pro-government or pro-de-
fense. If a woman were prosecuted for killing the man who she claims
raped her, the prosecutor would want to discredit that claim. In an ad-
versarial system, it is useful to be able to think like your adversary. Flip-
ping the roles of the government and the defense also helps illuminate the
values involved in deciding whether the man raped the woman.
6
Part II will focus on the social context in which rape issues arise. It
will examine the reviews of Last Tango in Paris by film critics Pauline
Kael, Richard Schickel and Norman Mailer. Their reviews reflect and
may help define social attitudes about what is acceptable behavior be-
tween men and women in this society, and social attitudes about race,
ethnicity and class. Part II will also explore social attitudes about the
credibility of women that are reflected in a popular casebook on evi-
dence. It will then discuss the influence that social attitudes might have
on the presentation and interpretation of evidence in a rape case based on
the scene from Last Tango. Finally, Part II will focus on what a lawyer
can do to expose the values that lie beneath those interpretations-for
example, through witness preparation, jury selection and the testimony
of expert witnesses.
Part III examines whether the man raped the woman in the scene
from Last Tango under traditional, rape reform and radical feminist no-
6. I have been both a prosecutor and a defense attorney. I was an Assistant United States
Attorney in the Southern District of New York from 1983 to 1987. I did not prosecute any
rape cases, which are generally not handled through the federal courts in New York. I also
served as a cooperating attorney with the NAACP Legal Defense Fund from 1980 to 1983,
defending people on Death Row. One client was wrongfully convicted and sentenced to die for
rape, sodomy and murder. His conviction and death sentence were reversed on appeal, and
the state subsequently dropped all charges. See Zant v. Nelson, 296 S.E.2d 590 (Ga. 1982),
cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1056 (1983), appeal after remand, 405 S.E.2d 250, 250-51 (Ga. 1991).
[Vol. 25:711
RAPE, LIES AND VIDEOTAPE
tions of rape. For radical feminists Catherine MacKinnon and Andrea
Dworkin, rape is about power and the domination of men and the subor-
dination of women. Part III will probe the implications of radical femi-
nist jurisprudence for the trial of a rape case. It considers how a lawyer
might translate competing legal standards and legal theories into evi-
dence that a jury can grasp. That is part of the broader problem of trans-
lating the complexities of everyday life into the courtroom.
The scene from Last Tango, while short, is complex and ambiguous.
A reader may feel confused, disoriented, or cheated without having a
summary of "what really happened" in the scene. That illustrates some
of the major points of this Article. Any summary would reflect an inter-
pretation of whether the man raped the woman. Any description would
necessarily shape the answer to that question. Prosecutors and defense
attorneys often feel confused and disoriented when they try to piece to-
gether a case from the conflicting testimony of witnesses and bits and
pieces of circumstantial evidence. Jurors may feel disoriented and con-
fused when they are asked to decide a case beyond a reasonable doubt.
A transcript of the dialogue appears in the Appendix. Although the
transcript is fair and accurate, it does not begin to capture the richness of
the scene. When I have described the exercise to people who have previ-
ously seen the movie, they commonly remember the scene as "the butter
scene," or sometimes as "the sodomy scene," but never as "the rape
scene." When I discussed the exercise and showed the film clip at the
Evidence Conference of the Association of American Law Schools, many
of the evidence professors were stunned that the students would consider
that a rape. As one professor put it, "their tripwire for when the aggres-
sor crosses the line into rape is sensitive indeed." Those reactions may
reflect varying social attitudes about what is acceptable behavior between
men and women.
The film is available on videotape. Ideally, each reader would watch
the scene; decide whether the man raped the woman; examine what val-
ues are reflected in that determination; try to describe the scene to some-
one else who has not seen it; and explore how that description is shaped
by the values and goals of the reader, and by the values of the other
person. Going through that experience would drive those points home in
ways that simply reading about the issues would not. Ideally, this Arti-
cle would include the film clip. That is beyond the present limitations of
this medium. I am working on that problem by developing interactive
multimedia materials on sex and violence.7
7. I recently received a grant to develop multimedia materials on Battered Woman Syn-
April 1992]
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This is not a trial manual for prosecuting or defending rape cases.
The exercise is a teaching device for enabling students to think about
rape issues the way trial lawyers do. However, the exercise is not only a
teaching device. The exercise helps illuminate the problem of rape and
how we teach, write and think about rape as a social and legal problem.
This is a progress report on a larger work in progress: developing a
clinical seminar on sex, violence and law, and producing multimedia
materials on evidence and criminal law.
II. SOCIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF SEX AND VIOLENCE
This Part will examine social attitudes about sex and violence, gen-
der roles, race and ethnicity, and class relations as reflected in reviews of
Last Tango, and social attitudes about the credibility of women as re-
flected in an evidence casebook. Such attitudes may affect how witnesses
and jurors interpret "what really happened" in a rape case. Trial lawyers
must understand those attitudes so that they can begin to think about
how to deal with them in the courtroom. Law professors must under-
stand those attitudes so that they can enable students to think like
lawyers.
A. Its Not About Rape: It's About Domination and Subordination
Different people may see the same scene, and some will see rape
while others will not. For example, when Last Tango in Paris was first
released in 1972, film critic Pauline Kael wrote: "I don't believe that
there's anyone whose feelings can be totally resolved about the sex scenes
and the social attitudes in this film .... It's like seeing pieces of your
life."8 According to Kael, Last Tango was "the most powerfully erotic
drome. The project will implement the approaches discussed in this Article. The materials
will include an interactive video lesson involving the testimony of a psychiatrist concerning
Battered Woman Syndrome in a criminal case in which a woman is charged with murder for
killing her abusive husband. The computerized video will show the direct examination of the
expert by the defense attorney at trial. The student will play the role of the prosecutor by
typing objections into the computer. The computer will then rule on the objections. The
computer will also contain information to place the testimony in a broader context, including
relevant statutes, cases, trial transcripts, writings on feminist jurisprudence, videotaped inter-
views with battered women and materials on jury selection. I received the grant from the
National Center for Automated Information Retrieval. Cf. John Markoff, Technology:
Mouse! Moviel Sound! Action!, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1991, § 3, at 11 (discussing develop-
ments in multimedia personal computers that allow user to interact with text, sound and video
images).
8. Pauline Kael, Introduction to BERNARDO BERTOLUCCI & FRANCO ARCALLI, BER-
NARDO BERTOLUCCI'S LAsT TANGO IN PARIS: THE SCREENPLAY 9, 18-19 (1973). Kael's
essay originally appeared in the New Yorker magazine when Last Tango in Paris was released.
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movie ever made," 9 and the "film that has made the strongest impression
on me in almost twenty years of reviewing." 10 What aspects of real life
does Kael see in the film? What does Kael consider erotic? According to
Kael, the film is about power, sexual warfare, sexual enslavement, domi-
nating men and adoring women, the aggression in masculine sexuality,
the man's sexual anger, his need to debase the woman and himself, and
his demands for total subservience to his sexual wishes." Although she
does not directly address the sodomy scene, 2 Kael feels that the woman
is "erotically sensitized by the rounds of lovemaking."' 3 Although the
relationship between the man and the woman is defined by sexual domi-
nation and subordination, Kael interprets that as eroticism; she does not
mention the possibility of rape. Yet to a radical feminist, rape is about
power and the domination of men and the subordination of women.
The question of whether the man raped the woman does not arise
for film critic Richard Schickel, writing in 1991.' 4 For Schickel, Marlon
Brando was not just playing a role. Brando was improvising and re-
vealing himself in the male character. The sodomy scene in Last Tango
symbolizes an act of rebellion by the Brando character against the bour-
geois values represented by the woman: "When Brando buggers Schnei-
der's chic, saucy, cultured little bourgeois ass, he is buggering everything
that has bugged him, all those middle-class importunings, all those de-
mands for discipline, responsibility and, while you're at it, how about a
Hamlet?"'5 For Schickel and other men like him who came of age in the
1950s, Brando was a rebel hero, "someone who appeared not to accept
the corporation as a model social institution, was scornful of bourgeois
manners and habits of mind, was capable of emblemizing the soul's im-
mutable need to say-well, all right, mumble--'no' on our behalf."' 6
For Schickel, the man in the scene is a construct that combines the char-
acter, the performance of that role, Brando's personality and Schickel's
9. Id. at 10.
10. Id. at 18.
11. Id. at 11, 16.
12. I use the word "sodomy" to refer to anal intercourse without thereby expressing any
normative judgment about the scene, or about sodomy. Cf. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186, 193-94 (1986) (until 1961, all 50 states outlawed sodomy; some still do); Jane E. Brody,
Who's Having Sex? Data Are Obsolete, Experts Say, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 28, 1989, at C1 (survey
of 2000 white middle-class women in Southwest found that 23.8% regularly and willingly
engaged in anal intercourse, much larger number than 8-10% that previous data had
suggested).
13. Kael, supra note 8, at 11.
14. RICHARD SCHICKEL, MARLON BRANDO: A LIFE IN OUR TIMES (1991). Schickel is a
movie critic for Time magazine.
15. Id. at 185.
16. Id. at 6.
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own fantasies about power, rebellion, women, sex and violence. The wo-
man in the scene, the female character, the actress, is not a human being:
she is a stage prop, an object, a symbol of bourgeois niceties that serves as
the target of Brando's youthful promise and rebellion, transformed now
into the anger and aggression of a mid-life crisis for the character-actor-
critic. 7 Schickel does not focus on the film as violence against women.
The film represents "elegant erotica" with an "intellectually ... soft-
core" twist.
1 8
For Norman Mailer, the sodomy scene is an "historic bugger[y]."' 9
The woman is not an individual human being. She is an object defined by
men, the daughter of a racist dead French army officer, and a symbol of
power that the Brando character overthrows through his sexual aggres-
sion: "It is nothing less than the concentrated family honor of the
French army she will surrender when Brando proceeds.., to bugger
her."20
In addition, Mailer reflects a fascination with penetration. Penetra-
tion has been the target of radical feminist critiques of sex, intercourse
and rape under conditions of male domination.2' Mailer's reaction to the
film makes it easy to see why. For Mailer, Last Tango is a disappoint-
ment because the sex was simulated: "Brando's real cock up Schneider's
real vagina would have brought the history of film one huge march closer
to the ultimate experience it has promised since its inception (which is to
re-embody life)."22 For Mailer, sex is intercourse is penetration is male
domination over a submissive sex object. Without real penetration and
some penetration shots, Last Tango is "a fuck film without the fuck. It is
like a Western without the horses."23 Intercourse without penetration is
not sex and certainly cannot be rape.
In contrast, Brando himself felt that the emotional relationship be-
tween the characters was more important than penetration. According
to Brando, " 'Bernardo wanted me to fuck Maria... on screen.... I told
him, "That's impossible. If that happens, our sex organs become the cen-
17. Maria Schneider played a subordinate role to Brando, who was the "power center" of
the film: she had fewer lines, and had to take off more clothes. Id. at 183.
18. Id. at 182-83.
19. Norman Mailer, A Transit to Narcissus, reprinted in BERTOLUCCI & ARCALLI, supra
note 8, at 199, 207. Mailer's essay originally appeared in the New York Review of Books on
May 17, 1973, shortly after Last Tango was released.
20. Id. at 206.
21. See, e.g., ANDREA DWORKIN, INTERCOURSE 121-43 (1987) (analyzing intercourse as
penetration, violation and occupation of subordinated women by dominant men).
22. Mailer, supra note 19, at 203. To achieve perfect realism, there was a "real need for
the real cock of Brando into the depths of the real actress." Id. at 204.
23. Id. at 213.
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terpiece of the film."' -24 Schneider, on the other hand, simply did not
want to have sex with Brando. According to Schneider: "'We were
never screwing on stage. I never felt any sexual attraction for him...
he's almost fifty you know, and'-she runs her hand from her torso to
her midriff, 'he's only beautiful to here! "25
B. Cultural Stereotypes
Cultural stereotypes based on gender, class, ethnicity and race per-
vade the film criticism of Last Tango. How can racial stereotypes be at
issue when all the people are white? Other people, people of color, have
race; white people are just people. The dominant, white culture defines
what is perceived as "normal" or "neutral"; departures from that
"norm" are perceived as different, deviant, "other." The film critics do
not explicitly focus on the fact that they themselves are white, and that
the man and the woman are white. This may create the illusion that the
critics enjoy a neutral or objective viewpoint, that race is not an issue in
the scene, and that race is not an issue in describing the scene.
Race is not a neutral issue in this society. Social attitudes about
what is acceptable behavior between men and women depend in part on
social attitudes about race, ethnicity and class. Those attitudes may af-
fect the interpretations of "what really happened," and whether the man
raped the woman. It is necessary to explicitly state the unstated assump-
tions and to explore what difference those assumptions make.26 What if
the man or the woman were black?
According to Pauline Kael, the woman is like "the adorably sensual
[white] bitch-heroines of French films of the twenties and thirties....
These girls know how to take care of themselves."27 The (white) "Amer-
ican male tough-guy sex role,"28 reflected in the Brando character, "is no
24. SCHICKEL, supra note 14, at 184 (quoting Marion Brando).
25. Mailer, supra note 19, at 204 (quoting Maria Schneider).
26. See, e.g., Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1331, 1369-87 (1988) (exposing
race consciousness is crucial to exposing beliefs that present social conditions are natural, inev-
itable and fair; in process of socially creating races, whites became associated with normatively
positive characteristics, and blacks with subordinate, aberrational characteristics); Richard
Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REv.
2411, 2435-41 (1989) (event that seems non-racist to whites may appear racist when viewed
from minority perspective); Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Foreword: Jus-
tice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REv. 10, 12-17, 31-34, 45-47, 58 (1987) (unstated point of
comparison may appear to be neutral and inevitable if left unstated; point of comparison must
be exposed and challenged by looking at issue from another point of view).
27. Kael, supra note 8, at 18.
28. Id. at 11.
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match for a French bourgeois girl."2 9 In the end, the woman wins the
sexual warfare that so enraptured Kael by shooting the man to death.
Kael need not worry about whether the man raped the woman-the
bitch can take care of herself.
According to Mailer, the woman "is every [white] eighteen-year-old
in a mini-skirt and maxi-coat who ever promenaded down Fifth Avenue
in that inner arrogance which proclaims 'My cunt is my chariot.' "3 In
other words, she asked for it. The man is a (white) American, ex-boxer,
ex-actor, ex-foreign correspondent, ex-adventurer and ex-gigolo.31 Ac-
cording to Schickel, the male character is the (white) rebel hero having a
mid-life crisis.32 It would be difficult for Mailer and Schickel to believe
that the Brando character raped the woman because they identify with
him, and because they objectify the woman.
How would each of those (white) witnesses feel if the man were
black and the woman were white? What if the man were a black, unem-
ployed, Algerian day laborer living in Paris after the Algerian revolution,
and the woman were, as she is, the daughter of a racist French army
officer? Would Kael still feel that the woman was erotically sensitized by
the rounds of lovemaking, and that the movie was the most powerfully
erotic film ever made? Eldridge Cleaver claimed that he raped white wo-
men as an insurrectionary act against racism (although he "practiced" by
raping black women first).33 Schickel and Mailer see the sodomy scene
as a rebellion by the Brando character against bourgeois values. "What a
waste!"-that is the reaction of the white cops who try to stop what they
mistakenly assume is an attempted rape, and learn that, in fact, the white
Italian woman is engaged in a friendly wrestling match with her black
boyfriend in Spike Lee's film Jungle Fever.34 Would those white cops
have made that mistake if the man and the woman were white? What if
the man in Last Tango were white and the woman were black? "Colored
girls just want to fuck all night," according to Mick Jagger and the Roll-
ing Stones in their hit song, Some Girls.35 Black women must be hard to
rape-consent comes so easily to them. 6 What if both the man and the
29. Id at 18.
30. Mailer, supra note 19, at 202.
31. Id. at 216.
32. SCHICKEL, supra note 14, at 184.
33. See ELDRIDGE CLEAVER, SOUL ON ICE 26 (1972).
34. JUNGLE FEVER (Four Acres and a Mule 1991).
35. THE ROLLING STONES, Some Girls, on SOME GIRLS (CBS Records 1978).
36. Joan Little, a black woman prisoner, was prosecuted for killing a jailer who allegedly
raped her, Social scientists working on her defense conducted a survey in the county where
she was to be tried. The survey contained two questions: "Do you believe that black women
have lower morals than white women? Do you believe that black people are more violent than
[V/ol. 25:711
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woman were black? Hispanic?37
The stereotypes about being a young middle-class white French wo-
man or a middle-aged, middle-class, white American man may seem rela-
tively innocuous. They are not innocuous if you share some of their
characteristics and that hurts you, or if you don't share some of their
characteristics and that hurts you.3 For example, the stereotypes are
white people?" Sixty-three percent of the sample responded yes to both questions. In a neigh-
boring county, "only" 35% of the sample responded yes to both questions. Little received a
change of venue and was subsequently acquitted. See W. LANCE BENNETF & MARTHA S.
FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE COURTROOM: JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT IN
AMERICAN CULTURE 179-80 (1981).
37. Cf TIE ME Up, TIE ME DOwN (El Deseo 1990) (film by Spanish filmmaker Pedro
Almodovar in which Spanish man kidnaps and ties Spanish woman to bed for days to make
her love him).
38. See, eg., Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Race, Gender and Violence Against Women: Conver-
gences, Divergences and Other Black Feminist Conundrums, 43 STAN. L. REv. (forthcoming
1992) (disregarding interaction between rape, sexism and racism can distort or erase experi-
ence of black women, who may be victims of all three); Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Demarginalizing
the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine,
Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 139-40 (tendency in
antidiscrimination doctrine to treat race and gender discrimination as distinct can marginalize
experience of black women, who are vulnerable to multiple forms of discrimination); Angela
Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581, 598-601
(1990) (discussing experience of black women and rape); Valerie Smith, Split Affinities: The
Case of Interracial Rape, in CONFLICTS IN FEMINISM 271, 278-84 (Marianne Hirsh & Evelyn
Keller Fox eds., 1990) (discussing tension between sympathy for white civil rights worker who
was raped and sympathy for black man accused of raping her); Jennifer Wriggins, Note, Rape,
Racism, and the Law, 6 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 103, 118-19 (1983) (rape against black women
was not considered crime in several states in Old South); see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 364 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) (89% of all men executed for rape in United States
since 1930 were black); Ellis Cose, Rape in the News: Mainly About Whites, N.Y. TIMES, May
7, 1989, § 4, at 27 (race and class help define what is news and what is not; any suggestion of
violence across racial lines is likely to push story onto front page); Bob Drogin, Rapes That Are
"Not as Heinous," L.A. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1992, at Al (discussing recent Australian rape case
which found rape of prostitute less grave because "prostitutes suffer little or no sense of shame
or defilement;" noting topic will be raised before Annual United Nations Committee oversee-
ing U.N. Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women); Jane
Gross, To Some Rape Victims, Justice Is Beyond Reach, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1990, at A14
(prostitutes and drug addicts are being raped with increasing frequency but rarely report rapes;
criminal justice system frequently disregards their claims). See generally HUBERT S. FEILD &
LEIGH B. BIENEN, JURORS AND RAPE 119-43 (1980) (suggesting that combined effect of vari-
ous factors, including juror, victim, defendant and case characteristics, are more significant in
predicting recommended sentences in rape cases than individual factors); HARRY KALVEN,
JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 249-54 (1966) (suggesting that jurors redefine
crime of rape by incorporating notions of contributory fault and assumption of risk by wo-
man). If the jury perceives that the woman in some sense assumed the risk of being raped, the
jury may find the defendant guilty of a lesser crime if given the option of doing so. If forced to
choose between a finding of rape and total acquittal, the jury will usually choose acquittal as
the lesser evil. This suggests that the jury is not saying that the defendant has not done any-
thing wrong, but that what the defendant did does not deserve to be classified as rape. Id. at
250-51, 254.
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not innocuous if you happen to be black rather than white and you are
charged with rape, or if you are raped.3 9 The stereotypes are not innocu-
ous if you happen to be a (young middle-class white French) woman, and
no one believes you when you claim you were raped.
C. Women's Credibility
One of the problems that women encounter when they are raped is
that no one believes them. People are conditioned to believe that a wo-
man is mistaken, fantasizing or just plain lying when she claims she was
raped. What can a lawyer do about the problem of women's credibility
in the courtroom? What are law professors doing to educate future
lawyers?
All of the materials in the casebook that I use in my evidence course
suggest that a woman is lying, fantasizing or mistaken when she claims
she was raped.' Nothing in the casebook suggests that a woman may be
telling the truth. There is nothing in the book on how to prove that a
woman was raped. For example, the casebook features a hypothetical in
which a woman driver who is involved in a car accident falsely accuses
her male passenger of sexually molesting her. The woman files the false
accusation in a police report so that she can blame the accident on the
man and thus defraud her insurance company.41 This transforms a hy-
pothetical about negligence and the admissions exception to the hearsay
rule into a statement that women lie when they cry rape. In addition, the
casebook contains only two cases involving rape.42 One case involves the
admissibility of psychiatric testimony that the woman was fantasizing
about having been raped. 3 Why was that case included in the casebook?
The other case involves an acquaintance rape that the editors use to
examine the admissibility of the woman's prior sexual conduct.44 There
are dramatic differences in how the appellate court and the casebook edi-
39. Analyzing rape prosecutions in Minneapolis, Gary LaFree concluded that the racial
dyad of the woman and the man is significant in predicting the outcome in rape cases. Black
men accused of raping white women are treated most harshly, and black men accused of rap-
ig black women are treated most leniently. GARY LAFREE, RAPE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCrION OF SEXUAL ASSAULT 140 (1989). In addition, jurors are less
likely to believe black women who complain of rape. Id. at 219-20.
40. JOHN KAPLAN & JON R. WALTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE (6th ed.
1986).
41. Id. at 162.
42. Id. at 433, 459.
43. Mosley v. Commonwealth, 420 S.W.2d 679, 680 (Ky. Ct. App. 1967).
44. State v. Cassidy, 489 A.2d 386 (Conn. App. Ct.), cert. denied, 492 A.2d 1239 (Conn.
1985).
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tors present the woman's account. The published opinion summarized
the woman's testimony in part as follows:
After she was in the bed, the defendant, who was undressed,
yelled, '[lady,] you came here to get fucked and that's exactly
what you are going to get. I'm going to fuck you until you
can't stand up.' He then lunged at her and forced her to submit
to vaginal intercourse. She attempted to leave the room but the
defendant grabbed her, turned her around, punched her in the
mouth and threw her on the bed on her stomach. After he tied
her arms behind her, gagged her, and forced her head down
into the bedding, the defendant forcibly performed anal inter-
course on her. He then offered to untie and ungag her if she
would do everything he said. She assented because she did not
want to be hit anymore. After untying her wrists and taking
the gag out of her mouth, the defendant again forcibly had vag-
inal intercourse with her and forced her to perform oral sex
with him.45
That information is highly relevant to show that the man raped the wo-
man. The editors nevertheless edited that portion of the opinion to read:
"After she was in the bed, the defendant * * * lunged at her and forced
her to submit to intercourse."46 Why was the case edited that way? As
edited, the case appears to involve an ambiguous encounter that arguably
could be interpreted from the defendant's perspective as kinky sex rather
than rape. The published opinion leaves little room for subtle interpreta-
tions. Perhaps the editors merely intended to sanitize the case, but they
thereby undermined the persuasiveness of the rape claim. What is worse:
quoting a graphic account containing four-letter words from a published
decision about rape, or undermining the claim of rape? Whose sensibili-
ties would be offended in each situation? Would a trial court in a rape
case legitimately exclude the information that the editors deleted on the
grounds of unfair prejudice?47
The treatment of rape in the casebook reflects and helps define social
attitudes about women's credibility in this society. It is important to
think about how rape is covered in the casebook, about casebooks as
legal institutions, about casebook authors as actors in the legal system,
about whether the casebook reflects the biases of the authors and about
whether people who use the casebook without reflecting on those issues
45. Id. at 388.
46. See KAPLAN & WALTZ, supra note 40, at 433.
47. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 403 (exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of unfair
prejudice).
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internalize the (subliminal?) message that women lie when they cry
rape.48 Those attitudes may go unnoticed unless they are explicitly iden-
tified and discussed.49
A lawyer needs to understand how a woman feels when she is raped,
and what a persuasive description sounds like, so that the lawyer can try
to translate that into a convincing presentation in the courtroom. It is
important to hear women speak for themselves about rape in situations
where their credibility is not at stake. It is important not to interpret
their stories through the biases of appellate judges, casebook editors and
law review writers. It is important to realize that obstacles to proving a
rape may arise not only because a woman may be lying, but also because
people may not believe a woman when she is telling the truth. For exam-
ple, studies suggest that a woman may be perceived as less credible be-
cause she uses what is perceived as a powerless speech style.5 0 This may
48. The casebook also contains another hypothetical on the state of mind exception to the
hearsay rule based on a real homicide case involving two lesbian lovers, but the authors
changed the facts into a hypothetical involving a heterosexual couple. Why? Is homosexuality
more offensive than murder? Is that an example of what radical feminists mean by compulsory
heterosexuality? Compare People v. Spencer, 71 Cal. 2d 933, 458 P.2d 43, 80 Cal. Rptr. 99
(1969) with KAPLAN & WALTZ, supra note 40, at 225.
My comments are directed at the sixth edition of the Kaplan & Waltz casebook. In re-
sponse to my comments at the AALS Evidence Conference, Roger Park, one of the editors of
the seventh edition, changed some of the material in that edition, which appeared in December
of 1991. See Letter from Roger Park to Robert Garcia (July 8, 1991) (on file with author);
JOHN KAPLAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE (7th ed. 1991).
49. My goals include preparing students to think like lawyers, to think of legal rules and
doctrines as tools for solving complex legal and social problems, and to think of ways of using
those tools to serve the best interests of their clients. Cf Irene Coombs, Crime in the Stacks, or
a Tale of a Text: A Feminist Response to a Criminal Law Textbook, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 117
(1988) (critiquing criminal law textbook from feminist perspective); Nancy S. Erickson, Final
Report: "Sex Bias in the Teaching of Criminal Law," 42 RUTGERS L. REV. 309 (1990) (advo-
cating inclusion of gender-related topics in law school curriculum); Nancy S. Erickson, Sex
Bias in Law School Courses: Some Common Issues, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 101 (1988) (noting
lack of law school courses with emphasis on gender issues and urging changes in casebooks
reflecting sexual bias); Kit Kinports, Evidence Engendered, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 413 (advo-
cating incorporation of feminist perspective to evidence).
50. A powerless speech style is characterized by the abundant use of hedges, hesitation
forms, polite forms, question intonations, intensifiers and qualifiers. See John M. Conley et al.,
The Power of Language: Presentational Style in the Courtroom, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1375, 1379-
86. Women use powerless speech more frequently than men, and poor and uneducated wit-
nesses use powerless speech more than other witnesses. Id. Variations in speech style may be
related more to social subordination than to gender roles. See WILLIAM M. O'BARR, LIN-
GUISTIC EVIDENCE: LANGUAGE, POWER, AND STRATEGY IN THE COURTROOM 70-71
(1982). However, according to Robin Lakoff, women use language differently from men. Gen-
der-related differences in language reflect cultural values about what it means to be a good man
or a good woman. Men's language is the language of the powerful. Women's language is the
language of the powerless, although some women can switch speech styles. See ROBIN T.
LAKOFF, TALKING POWER: THE POLITICS OF LANGUAGE IN OUR LIVES 198-214 (1990)
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affect the credibility of a woman in a rape case, whether the woman is the
victim or an eyewitness. For example, the government witness in the
exercise was a woman.5 1
The materials in an evidence course can include powerful accounts
by women about being raped, such as videotaped interviews of real rape
victims, Carolyn Craven's personal account of having been raped,52 a
transcript of a good direct examination of the woman in a rape case,
53
and a passage from Maya Angelou's autobiography, I Know Why the
Caged Bird Sings. 4 Angelou vividly describes two occasions when she
was molested and one occasion when she was raped as a child, and her
own testimony at trial. The passage illustrates the child's conflicted feel-
ings of affection towards and fear of the man; her enjoyment mingled
with shame about the early sexual encounters; the psychological impact
of sexual abuse on a child; and the trauma of forcing the child to face the
man who abused her at trial.55 Angelou, a poet, can voice what a child
knows and feels in ways that judges, lawyers and experts typically
cannot. 6
There is no "neutral" or "correct" way of presenting a woman's
account of a rape. Different women talk about rape in different styles,
what they say can be presented in dramatically different ways and the
presentations can be interpreted differently. Two documentaries illus-
trate those points. One documentary, Rape: Cries from the Heartland,
presents raw personal accounts by women of different cultural and eco-
(discussing how forms of women's speech reflect roles women are supposed to play in society);
see also Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on
the Hearing of Mrs G., 38 BUFF. L. REv. 1, 2-21, 55-57 (1990) (speech practices that accom-
pany race, gender and class domination may invite dominant speakers to dismiss or devalue
what subordinated people say).
51. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
52. Carolyn Craven, No More Victims, 2 SELF-DETERMINATION Q.J., Issue 2, at 11
(1978); see also SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL 387-419 (1975) (personal ac-
counts of women who have been raped).
53. See, eg., THOMAS MAUET, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRIAL TECHNIQUES 99-106 (2d ed.
1988).
54. MAYA ANGELOU, I KNOW WHY THE CAGED BIRD SINGS 59-74 (1970).
55. When the defense attorney asks whether the man touched her before the alleged rape,
the child lies and says no. The man is convicted, but is freed on bail the same day. Later that
day he is kicked to death. The child believes she is responsible for killing the man because she
lied at trial, and stops speaking. Id. at 69-74.
56. The evolving rules on child witnesses in sexual abuse cases should be studied in that
context. The problem is not simply one of constructing a coherent theory of the Sixth Amend-
ment right to confrontation. Cf. Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990) (discussing admis-
sibility of videotaped testimony of child witness in sexual abuse case under Confrontation
Clause).
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nomic backgrounds talking about being raped.57 The producer, using a
hand-held camera and harsh lighting, shows women in a police car, in a
rape treatment center and in a police station within minutes or hours
after they were raped. The other documentary, Campus Rape, shows
articulate, well-educated, attractive, well-groomed, apparently well-re-
hearsed young women talking about being raped. The producer, using
carefully framed, well-lit shots, shows the women in idyllic campus set-
tings, and the stars of L.A. Law narrate the film." Different viewers may
react differently to those presentations. Some viewers may find the first
documentary more riveting because the women's accounts ring so "true
to life" (whose life?). Some viewers may find it easier to relate to the
women in the second documentary because they are like those women,
and may find their accounts more compelling for that reason. Other
viewers may feel that the women in the second documentary appear to be
too well-rehearsed, and they may discount what the women say for that
reason. What are the implications of different styles for the presentation
and interpretation of evidence of rape at trial and throughout the crimi-
nal justice system?
D. Interpreting "What Really Happened"
How many layers are involved in interpreting "what really hap-
pened" in the scene from Last Tango? How many layers are involved in
interpreting a real rape case? The social science literature on trials tends
to focus on the role of the jury in processing information. 9 However,
57. Rape: Cries from the Heartland (HBO television broadcast, July 2, 1991).
58. CAMPUS RAPE (Santa Monica Rape Treatment Center at Santa Monica Hospital, Cal-
ifornia 1990).
59. According to the "story model" of jury decision-making, jurors organize the informa-
tion at trial by constructing stories based on the evidence and their own world knowledge. The
stories have a beginning, a middle and an end; events in the stories are causally connected; and
the characters in the stories are motivated by goals that cause actions. The jurors then test the
stories against the available verdicts. The jurors select the story and the verdict that "fit" the
best. Jurors with different attitudes, experiences and beliefs may construct different stories and
reach different verdicts. See Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Evidence Evaluation in Com-
plex Decision Making, 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 242 (1986); see also id. at 248
(presenting four different interpretations of a homicide, corresponding to first degree murder,
second degree murder, manslaughter and not guilty verdicts). See generally BENNETr &
FELDMAN, supra note 36 (discussing story construction and social judgment in criminal tri-
als); LINDA BROOKOVER BOURQUE, DEFINING RAPE (1989) (review of empirical research on
rape, with emphasis on why there is much disagreement in evaluating particular instance as
rape or not rape); REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY (1983) (studying psychology of
jurors, jury decision-making and jury deliberation); Gerald P. L6pez, Lay Lawyering, 32
UCLA L. REV. 1, 3 (1984) (people understand world through stock stories, and lawyering can
be described in story-telling terms); Albert J. Moore, Inferential Streams: The Articulation
and Illustration of the Trial Advocate's Evidentiary Intuitions, 34 UCLA L. REV. 611 (1987)
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jurors are not the only ones who interpret the evidence, and most cases
never go to trial." The participants in a sexual encounter, other wit-
nesses, investigators, prosecutors, defense attorneys and judges interpret
the information as well. The interpretation at any given point may also
reflect the combined effects of the interpretations of various players. For
example, when a good lawyer prepares a witness to testify, the lawyer
should have in mind how opposing counsel will cross-examine the wit-
ness, how the trial judge will rule on evidentiary objections, what other
witnesses may say, who is on the jury, what appellate courts have said in
similar cases in the past and what an appellate court is likely to do in this
case in the event of an appeal. This section will examine what a lawyer
can do to illuminate the values that lie behind various interpretations-
for example, through witness preparation, jury selection and expert
testimony.
1. Layers of interpretation
The following layers might be involved in a rape case based on the
scene from Last Tango. The interaction between various layers will be
examined below.
(1) There is "what really happened" between the man and the wo-
man. Here, this means what happened between the characters, rather
than what happened between the actors on the set. The sex between the
actors was simulated; the sex between the characters was not.
(2) There is the scene captured on the film.
(3) There is the woman's interpretation.
(4) There is the man's interpretation.
(5) Each viewer is a witness who interprets what happened. For
example, the art director of Last Tango intended to portray the scenes in
the apartment in "uterine" colors.61 Yet according to film critic Pauline
Kael, "the colors in this movie are late-afternoon orange-beige-browns
and pinks-the pink of flesh drained of blood, corpse pink."'62
(discussing how inferences are drawn from circumstantial evidence, and how advocate can use
that information to select and present evidence at trial); Albert J. Moore, Trial by Schema:
Cognitive Filters in the Courtroom, 37 UCLA L. REv. 273 (1989) (suggesting ways for trial
lawyers to accommodate jurors' limited information processing capabilities).
60. See BENNETr & FELDMAN, supra note 36, at 17, 147-50, 163-68 (suggesting that re-
search on criminal trials tends to focus on individual variables and offers incomplete theoreti-
cal framework for assessing how participants in criminal justice system organize information
and make judgments).
61. SCHICKEL, supra note 14, at 182; Mailer, supra note 19, at 201.
62. Kael, supra note 8, at 16; cf RAYMOND QUENEAU, EXERCISEs IN STYLE (Barbara
Wright trans., 1979) (Queneau observed man on bus accusing someone else of deliberately
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(6) A witness's testimony at trial may be different from the wit-
ness's original interpretation, because of memory loss over time, trial
preparation and the process of direct and cross-examination.
(7) Each lawyer formulates an interpretation. The lawyer's theory
of the case will shape witness preparation, trial strategy, plea bargaining,
motions to admit or exclude evidence, the presentation of evidence at
trial, direct and cross-examinations, arguments to the jury and the briefs
on appeal. 3 A prosecutor must be convinced of the guilt of the accused,
and in that sense the prosecutor must decide for herself "what really
happened." A defense attorney, on the other hand, does not have to
decide whether the defendant is guilty. The defense attorney generally
can focus on how the evidence can be interpreted to create a reasonable
doubt. In the seminar, the students who played the attorneys in particu-
lar had to explore the tension between their own values and their roles as
advocates. The defense attorney, for example, was happy to discredit the
claim of rape because she did not think that the man raped the woman
based on the accounts of the witnesses. After seeing the film clip, she was
distressed that she had helped discredit a legitimate claim of rape.6
(8) The jurors interpret the evidence as it comes in, during delibera-
tions and in their verdict. Who's on the jury?
(9) The trial judge may form an opinion about whether the defend-
ant is guilty or not, and whether the jury will find the defendant guilty or
not. The judge may create a more favorable courtroom climate for the
defendant if he or she thinks the defendant is not guilty. For example,
the judge's beliefs may affect the way he or she addresses the lawyers,
rules on objections, or reads the jury charge. The judge may signal his or
her views to the jury, and this may affect the outcome of the trial.6 5
Who's the judge?
(10) A judge writing an opinion for an appellate court interprets the
evidence in the so-called statement of "facts." What would the statement
jostling him, and later saw same man talking to friend about button on his coat; Queneau
describes experience ninety-nine ways).
63. See generally DAVID BINDER & PAUL BERGMAN, FACT INVESTIGATION: FROM HY-
POTHESIS TO PROOF (1984) (analyzing methods by which lawyers gather and prove facts of
case).
64. Cf. William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083
(1988) (examining personal values and lawyering).
65. See Peter David Blanck et al., The Appearance of Justice: Judges' Verbal and Nonver-
bal Behavior in Criminal Jury Trials, 38 STAN. L. REV. 89, 90-91, 140 (1985); cf. Kim Mur-
phy, 'Soft Touch'Bandit Gets a Break from Judge on Term, L.A. TIMES, May 10, 1989, § 2, at
1 (federal judge departed from sentencing guidelines and imposed lower sentence on woman
convicted of multiple bank robberies because she was under influence of boyfriend and women
have "soft touches" for men, "particularly if sex is involved").
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of facts look like in an appellate opinion summarizing the scene from
Last Tango? The statement of facts could vary dramatically depending
on whether the court was affirming or reversing a conviction of the man
for rape; depending on whether the court was affirming or reversing a
conviction of the woman for killing the man who raped her; and depend-
ing on who wrote the opinion. The summary of the facts on appeal is an
interpretation that reflects the values of the appellate judges and is many
layers removed from "what really happened.?'" Lawyers who have tried
cases frequently find it hard to recognize their cases as described in ap-
pellate opinions. It can be like seeing a bad snapshot of yourself and
asking: "Is that really what I look like?" Focusing on appellate opinions
ignores the interpretations of the many other actors in the criminal jus-
tice system that shaped the case before it got to the appellate court, and
the context in which those interpretations were shaped. The statement of
facts in an appellate opinion is a poor basis for discussing rape, but that is
how many of us think about and teach law.67
2. "What really happened" in the videotape?
The exercise relies on the use of what is depicted in the scene to
explore "what really happened" between the man and the woman, and to
explore their thoughts and emotions. Arguably, that raises several
problems: Last Tango in Paris is a work of art; real sexual encounters
are not as ambiguous as the encounter in that scene; and the woman did
not testify about whether she felt raped. Using the exercise does raise
some problems, but those problems are not necessarily flaws, and the
66. The majority and dissenting opinions in an appellate case can illustrate dramatic differ-
ences in the interpretation of the so-called "facts." See, e.g., State v. Rusk, 424 A.2d 720, 725-
28, 733-35 (Md. 1981) (interpretations of force and consent in rape case); Rabidue v. Osceola
Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 622-27 (6th Cir. 1986) (interpretations of impact of defendant's
actions on work environment in sexual harassment case), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987);
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420,424-25,450-51 (1980) (interpretations of homicide scene in
death penalty case); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262, 270-71 (1983) (interpretations of
relationship between unwed father and child in adoption proceeding).
The rules on relevance, character evidence, and discretionary balancing are tools for
preventing evidence of cultural stereotypes from being introduced at trial. See FED. R. EVID.
401-404, 608; see also United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 49 (1984) (admissibility of evidence
that witness is biased). What can be done about the attitudes that lawyers, jurors, and trial
and appellate court judges may bring to the courtroom?
67. See, e.g., Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1105-25 (1986) (discussing courts'
differing interpretations of facts constituting force, threats and consent); cf. Robert Garcia,
"Garbage In, Gospel Out'" Criminal Discovery, Computer Reliability, and the Constitution, 38
UCLA L. REv. 1043, 1097-1101 (1991) (excessive reliance on appellate opinions distorts our
understanding of criminal justice system).
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problems are not insurmountable.6" In fact, similar problems might arise
in a real rape case.
Some readers may feel that the exercise is flawed because Bertolucci
is a world class filmmaker and artist, and Last Tango is a work of art.
The ambiguities in deciding whether the man raped the woman are a
function of the artistic qualities of the film. The ambiguities would not
exist in real life. I disagree.
The scene from Last Tango is complex and open to interpretation.
That is why it works in the exercise. Focusing on the testimony of the
witnesses highlights the proof problems involved with rape. Focusing on
the scene itself highlights the normative issues in deciding what should
count as rape. The scene serves as a mirror that reflects the values of the
people who describe the scene, and the values of the people who decide
whether the man raped the woman. Their reactions and interpretations
are at least as important as what happens on the screen for purposes of
the exercise. One could instruct the witnesses to describe the scene itself,
rather than to pretend that they saw the event out the window. Certainly
the other students knew they were watching a film clip when they de-
cided that the man raped the woman. The scene itself is then the real-life
event. Using works of art to explore social attitudes about sex and vio-
lence is a legitimate enterprise.69
Real-life sexual encounters between men and women can also be
complex and open to interpretation. It would be more realistic to ob-
serve a real encounter between a man and a woman, but that would be
problematic for practical and ethical reasons. We would want to stop a
real rape, and we do not want to become a bunch of peeping toms. It
would be possible to use the witnesses or the participants in a real rape
case, but that would require giving up the degree of control provided by
clinical simulations.
A film may be as close to raw data as we can come in the seminar, or
68. Thinking about rape by using the statement of facts in appellate opinions, or by using
the vignettes that are commonly used in empirical studies, also entails some problems, but we
do it anyway. See generally BOURQUE, supra note 59, at 95 (one limitation of attribution
studies of rape is that simulation in most studies is presented so that it is assumed that rape
occurred; no studies have asked the subject whether event portrayed was rape); id. at 314-47
(discussing weaknesses and strengths of using vignettes-short descriptive statements of situa-
tion-in empirical studies of rape); HAsMtE et al., supra note 59, at 40-42 (discussing weak-
nesses of empirical studies of jury simulations). Are the results of the exercise statistically
significant? Every rape case is statistically significant to the participants and to the lawyers. In
any event, the exercise is not intended to be part of an empirical study (although it could be
used that way).
69. See, eg., DWORKIN, supra note 21, at 3-79 (exploring intercourse in works of Leo
Tolstoy, Kobo Abe, Tennessee Williams, James Baldwin and Isaac Bashevis Singer).
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in a criminal case. It would be more realistic to use a videotape of a real
sexual encounter.7' However, even a film of a real sexual encounter
might not resolve "what really happened," questions of credibility and
the normative issues of rape. A film might not capture the internal
thoughts and emotions of the participants. Did the man intend to rape
the woman? Did she feel raped?
The mental states in a criminal case are subject to interpretation
(and can be the subject of expert testimony) despite seemingly clear vide-
otaped evidence. For example, two white cops in Lynwood, California,
were charged with assault and with falsifying a police report after a traf-
fic stop of a black man that was secretly videotaped. One of the cops
stated in the police report that the black man talked back to the cops and
used four-letter words. The tape showed that the cop who prepared the
report used the obscenities, not the black man. A defense psychologist
testified that what the cop wrote in the report, even if inaccurate, was
how the cop remembered it, because he was suffering from post-trau-
matic stress disorder following the arrest. The cops were acquitted.71
Trying to decide whether the woman was raped without hearing
from the woman or the man is a problem with the exercise. However,
that also raises interesting issues in real life. There are rape cases where
the participants do not testify. For example, the woman will not testify if
she is dead. In addition, if there is other evidence that a rape occurred,
the prosecution and the woman may wish to spare the woman the ordeal
70. A recent development in home video is couples who videotape themselves having sex
and then distribute the tapes commercially. See Michael DeCourcy Hinds, Starring in To-
night's Erotic Video: The Couple Down the Street, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1991, at A14. Some
of those tapes might depict what is arguably a rape-particularly if the couples act out the type
of behavior that is depicted in commercial movies, such as Last Tango in Paris.
71. Roxana Kopetman, Charges Against Officers in Video 'Sting' Dismissed, L.A. TIMES,
May 14, 1991, at Al; cf. United States v. Salerno, 937 F.2d 797, 809-10 (2d Cir. 1991) (revers-
ing RICO conviction because defense counsel was improperly denied opportunity to cross-
examine FBI agents for possible bias in recording and transcribing surveillance tapes); JOSEPH
F. O'BRIEN & ANDRIS KURINS, Boss OF BOSSES: THE FALL OF THE GODFATHER: THE FBI
AND PAUL CASTELLANO 197 (1991) (describing ambiguities of surveillance tapes); Melinda
Beck et al., Video Vigilantes, NEWSWEEK, July 22, 1991, at 42, 45 (discussing video cameras
as high-tech witnesses for police officers, investigators and private citizens).
New technologies can also call into question whether something that is depicted in a video
or audio tape actually took place. See generally Garcia, supra note 67, at 1045-68 (discussing
growing use of computerized information in criminal cases); Robert Garcia, Demo or Die:
Computer Reliability, the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the Confrontation Clause (article in
progress, on file with author) (analyzing admissibility of digital photographs, movies and
sound recordings and other forms of computerized information at trial); Geoffrey Cowley et
al., Frames or Frame-Ups: Can the Camera Lie?, NEWSWEEK, July 22, 1991, at 44, 45 (dis-
cussing potential for altering videotaped evidence).
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of testifying.72 If a woman is prosecuted for killing the man who alleg-
edly raped her, she might decide not to testify at trial. If the woman
made a statement to the police, the woman's statement might be sup-
pressed. In such situations, the jury would have to decide whether the
man raped the woman without her testimony.73 Similarly, a man
charged with rape might choose not to testify, or might have his state-
ment suppressed. Obviously, the man will not testify at her trial if she
killed him. The woman in Last Tango shoots the man to death at the
end of the movie, and then claims that he tried to rape her.74
If there is no videotape, whether the man raped the woman raises
serious proof problems. If there is a tape, what does the testimony of the
participants add? Additional layers of interpretation?
For example, according to police reports, two college students re-
cently videotaped themselves repeatedly raping and beating a nineteen-
year-old woman for several hours in an apartment in Connecticut.7" The
two then tried to blackmail the woman by threatening to release the tape
if she called the police. The woman went to the police, who arrested the
two suspects and seized the tape pursuant to a search warrant. Accord-
ing to the police, the tape showed the men sexually assaulting the woman
with inanimate objects while she was semi-comatose from drinking. At
one point, the two men joked about the woman as she lay motionless.
"Geez, I wonder if she's dead?" one of them reportedly said.76 One
detective who saw the tape said it was "degradation, pure and simple,"
and that the tape was "one of the cruelest things" he had ever seen."
Nevertheless, the woman subsequently said she was not raped.7" "I hon-
72. In the Central Park jogger case, for example, the prosecutors stated that they believed
they had enough evidence to obtain convictions without the woman's testimony and that the
decision to call her as a witness would depend on her best interests. Ronald Sullivan, Defense
Hopes to Block Park Jogger's Testimony, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1989, at B8. Ultimately, how-
ever, the woman testified that she had not voluntarily had intercourse with anyone for several
days before the attack. This supported an inference that the sperm found in her vagina came
from the assailants, and not from her boyfriend. William Glaberson, Reporter's Notebook- As
Jogger Trial Unfolds, the Fear Hits Home, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1990, at BI, B2.
73. The students were instructed to draw no inference from the fact that the woman did
not testify. The students presumably did not take the absence of the woman's testimony into
account when they decided whether she was raped, because her testimony was not available
either when the witnesses testified or when the students saw the film.
74. The woman's last words in the movie are: "I don't know who he is. He followed me
on the street. He tried to rape me. He's a madman. I don't know his name. I don't know his
name. I don't know who he is.. . ." BERTOLUCCI & ARCALLI, supra note 8, at 197.
75. Jacques Steinberg, 2 Videotaped Themselves in Rape, Authorities Say, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 13, 1991, at B3.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Woman Says Video Doesn't Prove Rape, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1991, at A13.
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estly don't think they should be charged with rape. The whole thing has
been blown out of proportion. ' 79 She told police she knew she had sex
with at least one of the men, one of whom was her boyfriend, but she was
not sure whether she had agreed.8 0 One of the men subsequently pleaded
no contest to a lesser assault charge and was sentenced to a one year
suspended sentence with two and one-half years of probation. The other
man has applied for accelerated rehabilitation on a lesser assault
charge."1
Sometimes a tape will eliminate credibility issues. For example,
rape charges against a photographer in Los Angeles involving two sepa-
rate women were dismissed at the prosecutor's request after the defend-
ant produced a videotape during his trial, apparently showing that the
first woman was a willing participant.8 2 The defense did not produce the
tape until after each woman testified that the defendant had attacked her.
The state also dropped the charges in the second incident, which in-
volved the woman's word against the man's, because that incident would
have been difficult to prove without the evidence in the first incident to
establish a pattern.83 The defense did not produce the tape until the trial
in order to ensure that charges involving both women 
were dismissed.84
The prosecution is considering perjury charges against the first woman.
5
Where does that leave the second woman: there is no reason to think she
is lying, but the charges against the man for raping her have been dis-
missed because who would believe her?
3. What did the witnesses see, hear and say?
Why did the students decide that any claim of rape was unfounded
based on the testimony, but that the man raped the woman based on the
film clip? Did the witnesses do something wrong? Did the lawyers do
something wrong? The government witness was a woman, and the de-
fense witness was a man. Did that make any difference? Could the pros-
ecutor have done anything differently to make the government witness
more persuasive? What happens in the process of witness preparation?
The student jurors agreed that the lawyers had not done anything
79. Id.
80. Nick Ravo, Woman Now Denies Being Raped on Video, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 26, 1991, at
A16; see also 2 Held in Taped Rape Are Beaten by Inmates, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1991, at B2.
81. Suspect in Taped Rape Will Not Go to Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1992, at A9.
82. Michael Connelly, Photographer's 2 Sexual Assault Cases Dropped after Videotape
Viewed, L.A. TIMES (Valley Ed.), Apr. 18, 1991, at B3.
83. Id. at B6.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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"wrong." The prosecutor and the defense attorney performed well on
direct and cross-examination. The students also agreed that the wit-
nesses had not done anything "wrong." The witnesses testified truthfully
about what they saw and heard. Neither witness had any motive to lie.
However, the government witness generally remembered fewer details.
The defense witness seemed to remember much more of the conversation
that actually took place in the scene.8 6
Do men and women interpret sex and violence differently? The de-
fense witness, a man, testified twice that the man in the scene said "I love
-.you" to the woman. In fact, the man in the film clip did not say that.
'The government witness, a woman, did not say anything about love. The
defense witness testified that the woman in the apartment was not crying.
The government witness testified that the woman in the apartment was
crying. In fact, the film clip shows that the woman was crying. Was the
defense witness "mistaken" about the love and the tears? Or did the
defense witness associate what he saw and heard with love? Has he been
conditioned to ignore what a woman says and does? Does that mean the
defense witness was biased? Can that type of "bias" be tested through
cross-examination at trial? If he associates what he saw and heard with
love, is that because he is a man, or because of his personal back-
ground? 7 We could say that the defense witness was "mistaken," be-
cause we can compare what he said to what is depicted in the film. What
if, as is usually the case in a real trial, there was no videotape to serve as a
check on his testimony?
Maybe the students perceived the defense witness as more credible
because he seemed to remember more details, or perhaps because he ex-
pressed himself with greater certainty. Empirical studies suggest that
witnesses who use a powerful speech style are perceived as being more
credible than witnesses who use a powerless speech style. Women gener-
ally use a powerless speech style more frequently than men.88 A lawyer
could use pretrial witness preparation to improve a witness's testimonial
style and credibility, and to create a more favorable impression with the
86. The description of the testimony at trial is based on the notes that I took at the time.
My notes and the description in the text, of course, reflect additional layers of interpretation.
87. "The safest generalization that can be made from all the research on gender differences
[among mock jurors in rape trials] is that female students are more likely than male students to
regard the defendant in a rape case as guilty and that males participate at higher rates in
deliberations than females." HASTIE et al., supra note 59, at 141; see id. at 140-42 (surveying
empirical research on juror gender). See generally THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL
DIFFERENCE (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 1990) (essays on sexual difference by scholars in various
disciplines); Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279
(1987) (interpreting biological and cultural differences between men and women).
88. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
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jury. 9 A lawyer could also educate the jury about the impact of testimo-
nial style on a witness's credibility through arguments to the jury,90 or
through the use of expert testimony. On the other hand, witness prepa-
ration may distort the witness's memory by altering the content of what
the witness remembers, or by altering the certainty with which the mem-
ory is held. If a lawyer changes the speech style of the witness, does that
make the witness simply appear to be more credible to others, or does it
change the witness's interpretation?91
Empirical studies on eyewitness identification indicate that the expe-
rience of the attorney has no effect on the ability of mock jurors to distin-
guish between accurate and inaccurate eyewitness identifications.92 The
perceived confidence of the witnesses was the major determinant of juror
belief, despite the fact that the mock jurors rated the experienced lawyers
as having done a better job.93 What are the implications of those studies
for rape trials where the identity of the perpetrator is not an issue? There
are no "eyewitnesses" to the mental states of the man and the woman in
a rape case, or to the other normative issues of rape. The quality of the
lawyering might make a difference on the normative issues. Good lawy-
ering might require, for example, creative pretrial preparation, skillful
jury selection, and the presentation of expert testimony to place the evi-
dence at trial and the normative issues in the proper social context.94
89. See generally O'BARR, supra note 50, at 61-75, 127-35 (discussing differences in speech
styles of courtroom witnesses). Witnesses who speak in a powerful style, avoid unnaturally
formal speech patterns, testify with minimal assistance from counsel, and resist efforts by op-
posing counsel to cut short their answers may make a more favorable impression on the jury.
Id. at 113-14.
90. Id.
91. See John S. Applegate, Witness Preparation, 68 TEx. L. REV. 277, 298-304, 308-14,
322-23, 328-34 (1989) (arguing that witness preparation may unwittingly turn skeptical wit-
ness into "true believer," causing witness to in effect change testimony); Olin G. Wellborn III,
Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1081-82 (1991) (arguing that even benign advice re-
garding demeanor by ethical attorney can occasionally contribute to cognitive distortion).
92. See R.C.L. Lindsay et al., Mock-Juror Belief ofAccurate and Inaccurate Eyewitnesses:
A Replication and Extension, 13 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 333, 336-37 (1989).
93. Confidence is not a good predictor of accuracy in eyewitness identifications. Mock
jurors do no better than chance in distinguishing between accurate and inaccurate eyewitness
identifications. Id.; Wellborn, supra note 91, at 1088-91.
94. Even the minimal guarantees of due process and the effective assistance of counsel
under the Constitution may require the assistance of expert testimony to help the jury under-
stand a woman's condition if she is prosecuted for killing the man who raped her. Cf. Dunn v.
Roberts, 768 F. Supp. 1442 (D. Kan. 1991) (woman convicted of murder, kidnapping, battery
and robbery was denied state funds for expert services concerning Battered Woman Syndrome
and "a disassociate response" to develop defense that she was under influence and control of
co-defendant at time of crimes; denial violated due process and effective assistance of counsel).
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4. Who's on the jury?
The students who decided whether the man raped the woman were
relatively young women law students who had studied rape, rape reform,
feminist perspectives on rape, Rape Trauma Syndrome, rape myths, and
problems with the credibility of women. They were politically progres-
sive and came from a variety of racial, cultural and economic back-
grounds. Based on my experience as a trial lawyer, and based on the
empirical studies on jurors and rape,9s I would have predicted that this
group of people in the context of this case was ideal for the prosecutor to
get a rape conviction. Yet the students unanimously decided that the
claim of rape was unfounded based on the testimony. On the other hand,
the students did agree that the man raped the woman based on the film
clip. A different group of people might not have reached that conclusion.
What if individuals like Pauline Kael, Norman Mailer and Richard
Schickel were on the jury? What if individuals like Catherine Mackin-
non and Andrea Dworkin were on the jury?
The reactions to the film clip suggest that while significant members
of this society would be willing to convict a man for doing what the man
did in the scene from Last Tango, others do not consider what the man
did a crime. It is unlikely that a jury consisting of a group of individuals
similar to the students would be seated in a rape case at the present time.
The process of jury selection may serve as a check on the use of the law
to achieve rape reform, regardless of what the criminal law and the rules
of evidence say.
The rules of evidence are a child of the jury system, yet we seldom
focus on the issues of jury composition and jury selection in evidence
courses. We should. We can. Selection strategies depend heavily on the
particulars of a specific case, such as the nature of the charge, what the
95. See, e.g., FEILD & BIENEN, supra note 38 (empirical study exploring combined effects
of various characteristics, including race, physical attractiveness, and moral character of vic-
tim; race of defendant; strength of government's case; personal background of jurors; and ju-
rors' attitudes towards women and knowledge about rape, in predicting severity of sentences in
simulated rape cases); id. at 95-98 (cataloguing empirical literature on extra-evidentiary factors
that may affect outcome in rape trials, including juror, victim, defendant and case characteris-
tics); HASTIE et al., supra note 59, at 121-23 (suggesting dangers of mechanically applying
rules of thumb for jury selection); id. at 123-35 (discussing social science methods for system-
atic jury selection); id. at 237 (discussing dangers of overgeneralizing selection strategies); cf.
Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 480 (1990) (Sixth Amendment requires impartial, not repre-
sentative, jury); David Margolick, Idea of a Jury of Peers is Questioned, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 17,
1992, at A9 (states are beginning to experiment with requiring racial and sexual diversity on
juries in criminal cases); David Margolick, As Selection of Smith Jurors Begins, Focus Is on
History of the Kennedys, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1991, at A10 (discussing jury selection and jury
consultant in rape trial).
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evidence shows, who the witnesses are, who the defendant is, who the
lawyers are, and who else is in the jury pool. It is not enough to read
about empirical studies on juries in the abstract. We should think about
these issues in the context of a particular case.96
The preceding sections focused on the contexts in which rape cases
arise, independent of the legal definition of rape. What difference does
the substantive criminal law make?
III. WAS IT RAPE?
In returning a guilty verdict after seeing the film clip, the students in
the seminar were sending several messages: that is not the way they want
to be treated when they have sex, that is not the way men should treat
women and the criminal law should back them up. Was it rape? How
should rape be defined? This section will examine those issues under a
traditional definition of rape, under the Michigan rape reform statute and
under a radical feminist interpretation of rape. This section will also ex-
plore what evidence is relevant under different definitions of rape. Many
of the questions throughout this section are not intended as rhetorical
questions in a Socratic dialogue. They are the types of questions that
would guide a lawyer's investigations in this particular case.
A. A Traditional Definition of Rape
Rape is traditionally defined as penetration, however slight, through
the use of force and without the consent of the woman. 97 The mental
state concerning the lack of consent varies from jurisdiction to jurisdic-
tion.98 In many jurisdictions, the woman need not actually consent.
Mistake as to consent is a defense. Under a subjective standard, the mis-
take must be honest. Under a criminal negligence standard, the mistake
must be honest and reasonable.99 Mistake is judged on the basis of the
information available to the man. The woman might honestly feel she
96. For example, we can use the documentary Inside the Jury Room to discuss jury selec-
tion. Frontline: Inside the Jury Room (WGBH television broadcast, Apr. 8, 1986). The pro-
ducers filmed the actual jury deliberations in a prosecution for illegal possession of a handgun.
The defendant was a sympathetic person with limited intelligence, and the jury nullified the
charge. Although the documentary focuses on the jury deliberations, the case was probably
won at the jury selection stage. An experienced trial lawyer can predict how the jury will view
that case just by looking at the jurors and reading the background information about each
juror that appears on the screen at the beginning of the program.
97. See, e-g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 515-40 (1987).
98. See generally Estrich, supra note 67, at 1096-1105 (discussing various legal standards).
99. Compare Regina v. Morgan, App. Cas. 182 (H.L. 1976) (mistake need only be honest)
with People v. Mayberry, 15 Cal. 3d 143, 542 P.2d 1337, 125 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1975) (adopting
negligence rather than strict liability standard).
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was raped, but the defendant is not guilty of rape if the defendant be-
lieved the woman consented even under a negligence standard. 10
The acceptable level of force can involve a high level of force.101
Although resistance by the woman is not an element of the offense,
whether the woman resisted is relevant to establish force and lack of con-
sent. Whether the woman resisted is also relevant to establish whether
any mistake was honest or reasonable.102
1. The lack of consent
The exercise makes it possible to explore how consent is and should
be defined in a realistically complex context. What constitutes consent:
what the woman said, what she did, or the totality of circumstances?
Even if consent should be defined so that "no means no," did the woman
say "no" in the scene from Last Tango? What did "no" mean in that
context? Was she crying? What does the evidence show?
The dialogue in the scene is complex and ambiguous. The words are
used as symbols in an elaborate and intimate code that is part of the
emotional relationship between the man and the woman. Real people
frequently talk that way in real life. Would an eyewitness who observed
the scene once in real time, and who did not know what was going on,
and who did not know that she would be questioned later, or what she
would be asked, and who did not know rape or evidence law, listen for
the woman to say the word "no," remember in what context the woman
said it, and testify about that unambiguously at trial, even if the witness
were sincere and unbiased?
One of the strongest arguments that the man raped the woman is
that the woman said "no" and cried, but the man went ahead anyway.
However, the evidence in the exercise was problematic as to what the
woman meant when she said "no." There was conflicting evidence about
whether she was crying. The government witness testified that she heard
the word "no" at one point. She believed that the woman was resisting
because the woman said "no." However, the witness also testified that
the woman said "no" when the man asked her if she was afraid. The
government witness testified four times that the woman was crying. She
100. See, e-g., People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 250 n.12, 681 P.2d 291, 300 n.12, 203 Cal.
Rptr. 450, 459 n.12 (1984).
101. See, e.g., State v. Alston, 312 S.E.2d 470, 475 (N.C. 1984) (reversing rape conviction
despite physical abuse and verbal threats by defendant, undressing of woman against her will
and pushing her legs apart to achieve penetration).
102, See, e.g., People v. Barnes, 42 Cal. 3d 284, 303 n.19, 304, 721 P.2d 110, 121 n.19, 122,
228 Cal. Rptr. 228, 240 n.19 (1986) (resistance is not element of rape, but may be evidence of
nonconsent and mistake).
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testified that the woman was crying while the man was thrusting into
her. She did not recall when the woman started crying. The defense
witness, on the other hand, testified that the man asked the woman if
they should open the secret compartment in the floor, and she said "no."
The man asked her if she was afraid, and she said "no." The defense
witness testified that the woman was not crying. Even if she was crying,
what did the crying mean? A woman can consent through her tears,
according to the courts. 103
Setting aside the problems with the witnesses' testimony, what does
the film show? What did the woman mean when she said "no" in the
context of this scene? "No," don't open up the hiding place? What does
the hiding place refer to: the hollow place in the floor, or her body?
Does she mean "no," she is not afraid? Not afraid of what? Not afraid
of exposing some family secrets? Does "family secrets" refer to what
might be in the hiding place in the floor, or does it refer to her body?
Does she mean "no," she is not afraid of the man? "No," she is not
afraid of anal intercourse? Does she mean "no," she will not repeat what
the man wants her to repeat? Does she mean "no," she does not want to
have anal intercourse? What about the fact that she stayed in the apart-
ment after he fell asleep, listened to some music with him when he woke
up, and is swaying to the music as the scene ends?
Assume that the woman meant she did not want to have intercourse
when she said "no." From whose perspective should the meaning of the
word "no" be determined: From the perspective of the woman, or the
perspective of the man? What evidence is there of what she thought she
meant? What evidence is there of what he thought she meant? What
does the viewer think she meant? What is the reasonable meaning of the
word "no" in the context of this scene? Did the man know that "no"
meant "No, I do not want to have anal sex?" What if it never entered his
mind? Was the woman crying? Did the man hear the "no" in the con-
text of the crying, and ignore the woman? Or did the man in the scene,
like the defense witness, not realize that the woman was crying? If "no"
was ambiguous in this context, should the man have asked for clarifica-
tion? What if it never entered his mind that "no" here was ambiguous?
What legal standard should apply to the consent issue? Did the wo-
man in fact consent? Should consent in fact be required? Should mistake
be a defense? What mental state should apply to the consent issue? Was
the man's purpose to have intercourse without her consent? Did the man
know that "no" meant "No, I do not want to have anal sex?" Was the
103. See, eg., Alston, 312 S.E.2d at 475.
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man aware of a risk that the woman did not consent? Did the man make
an honest mistake? Did the man make a reasonable mistake? Should the
man be criminally liable for negligence?
In the context of rape, arguably, the man should be liable for crimi-
nal negligence because of the gravity of the injury, the need for deter-
rence, and the blameworthiness of the individual who has the capacity
and the opportunity to do better, but does not do so. The punishment
could be less to reflect the lower culpability. On the other hand, reasona-
bleness is an evolving standard. Should the criminal law be used to rede-
fine what is acceptable behavior between men and women in bed? What
about fair warning to the man in times of change-like now?
If negligence is the standard, what does negligence mean? Is it un-
reasonable for a man to proceed when the woman says, "No, I do not
want to have sex?" Many people today believe that it is. Did "no mean
no" when Last Tango was released in 1972? Is it unreasonable to pro-
ceed without clarification when the woman says "no," but the meaning
of "no" is ambiguous, as it is here? Is there any obligation on the part of
the woman to be clear when she says "no"? "What part of 'no' don't you
understand?" 1" Should the man ask and be certain? Does this scene
raise the same problems as if the man were claiming, "Her lips said 'no,
no,' but her eyes said 'yes, yes' "?
Even under a negligence standard, consent could be defined so that
only "yes means yes": a woman must affirmatively consent to the act
actually engaged in on a specific occasion. It is unreasonable for a man
to have intercourse unless the woman affirmatively consents. Under that
standard, the man raped the woman. The man never asked, and the wo-
man never said, whether or how she wanted to have sex. That standard
scares the hell out of a lot of men. Is affirmative consent too much to
ask? May I have this dance? Would you like to tango? Would you like
to make love? Would you like to have anal sex? Society may not want to
impose a standard under the criminal law that only "yes means yes. ' 101
104. I saw that written on a woman's T-shirt at UCLA.
105. See State v. Lederer, 299 N.W.2d 457, 460 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980) (although Wisconsin
statute defines consent as words or actions indicating freely given agreement to have inter-
course or sexual contact, court apparently construed language so that "no means no"); Dana
Berliner, Note, Rethinking the Reasonable Belief Defense to Rape, 100 YALE L.J. 2687, 2702
n.99 (1991) (prosecutors apparently do not apply standard requiring affirmative consent in
Wisconsin); id. at 2703 (advocating rebuttable presumption that belief of consent is not reason-
able if victim offered verbal resistance, any physical resistance, or cried); see also Toni Pickard,
Culpable Mistakes and Rape: Relating Mens Rea to the Crime, 30 U. TORONTO LJ. 75 (1980)
(advocating criminal negligence regarding consent); Robin D. Wiener, Note, Shifting the Com-
munication Burden: A Meaningful Consent Standard in Rape, 6 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 143,
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Under a negligence standard, the jury must decide what is socially
reasonable. The jury must decide what is acceptable sexual behavior be-
tween men and women. Who's on the jury?
How can a lawyer help the jury understand the values that are re-
flected in the determination of what is acceptable behavior between men
and women, and the social context in which that question arises? That is
what experts are for: to educate the jury. For example, Pauline Kael,
Norman Mailer and Richard Schickel eroticize the use of women as
targets for the sexual aggression and frustrations of middle-aged white
men. The critics describe a relationship of male domination and female
subordination, but they fail to draw any connection between rape and
power.10 6 To a radical feminist, that is what rape is all about. An expert
could help the jury understand the connections between power, rape and
gender domination. 107 An expert could illuminate how images of sex and
violence-in films like Last Tango in Paris, and in the reviews of that
film-reflect and may help shape interpretations of what is acceptable
behavior between men and women. An expert could illuminate how ste-
reotypes about gender, race, ethnicity and class affect interpretations of
"what really happened." An expert could help a jury understand the
159 (1983) (advocating standard which requires overt behavior demonstrating consent to sex-
ual contact).
106. The film critics did not watch just one scene from Last Tango; they reviewed the entire
film. Knowing more about the relationship between the man and the woman could be helpful
in deciding whether the man raped the woman. That is a problem with the exercise. The
witnesses in the exercise truthfully testified that they had never seen the man and the woman
together before, and never saw them again. However, real cases are commonly tried with
whatever bits and pieces of evidence are available to interpret an historical event. There might
not be any other evidence in a real case if the man and the woman do not testify (although that
would be rare). The relationship between the man and the woman would raise interesting
issues concerning the relevance of prior sexual conduct. For example, if the woman must
affirmatively consent to the act actually engaged in on this occasion, how is the prior relation-
ship relevant? See FED. R. EvID. 412 (admissibility of complaining witness's prior sexual
conduct in rape case); 23 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 5382 (1980 & Supp. 1991) (discussing legality and politics of
rape); Beverly Balos & Mary Louise Fellows, Guilty of the Crime of Trust: Nonstranger Rape,
75 MINN. L. REV. 599 (1991) (exploring assumption that prior relationship between man and
woman is relevant to establish consent or mistake); Harriet R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims
in the State and Federal Courts: A Proposal for the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REv. 763,
808-12, 903-06 (1986) (sexual history of alleged victim with accused is generally admissible;
sexual history of alleged victim with persons other than accused is inadmissible if offered to
prove that alleged victim consented, or that alleged victim is lying, but should be admissible
for other purposes if relevance does not depend on invidious inference of unchaste character);
Leon Letwin, "Unchaste Character," Ideology, and the California Rape Evidence Laws, 54 S.
CAL. L. REv. 35, 54-62 (1980) (examining relevance of prior sexual conduct).
107. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 702 (expert testimony is admissible if it will help trier of fact
to understand evidence or to determine fact in issue).
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impact that sexual and racial discrimination have on how people inter-
pret what goes on around them.0 8 An expert could illuminate the issues
that this Article has tried to illuminate. The use of expert testimony to
help the jury understand the social context for rape would go beyond the
use of Rape Trauma Syndrome to show the lack of consent, or to explain
the woman's subsequent conduct.'0 9 This use of expert testimony would
go beyond dispelling misconceptions about rape." 0 This use of expert
testimony would help educate not only the jury, but also the lawyers, the
judges and the public generally.
Of course, if the government offered such testimony against a man
in a prosecution for rape, the defense would object. If the defense offered
such testimony in the trial of a woman for killing the man who allegedly
raped her, the government would object. The courts could manipulate
the admissibility of such testimony.'' The question of whether the evi-
dence would help the jury might get lost in the scuffle. Litigating the use
of expert testimony for these purposes could take years of litigation on a
state-by-state basis.
Should the standard of criminal negligence be described in terms of
the reasonable man, the reasonable woman or the reasonable person?
The phrasing of the reasonableness standard may be of largely symbolic
or rhetorical significance." 2 The phraseology should not mask the basic
policy issues discussed above. The jury can be asked to decide what is
socially reasonable, but the jury should consider the social context in
108. Cf. Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work
and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 9 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 195, 218-20
(1986) (using expert testimony to help jury understand what is socially reasonable and to over-
come sex-bias); Patricia A. Tetreault, Rape Myth Acceptance: A Case for Providing Educa-
tional Expert Testimony in Rape Jury Trials, 7 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 243, 243 (1989) (expert
testimony can provide jurors with social framework to evaluate evidence in particular case).
109. See Bridget Clarke, Comment, Making the Woman's Experience Relevant to Rape:
The Admissibility of Rape Trauma Syndrome in California, 39 UCLA L. REv. 251, 270-87
(1991) (using Rape Trauma Syndrome to prove nonconsent, and to dispel myths about rape).
110. See Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea of a Fair
Trial in Rape Prosecutions, 24 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 1013, 1067, 1069-70 (1991) (advocating
use of expert testimony to dispel juror misconsceptions about rape).
111. See Clarke, supra note 109, at 252 n.8, 260-64, 267-70, 283-85 (discussing how courts
manipulate admissibility of Rape Trauma Syndrome).
112. Cf. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879-80 (9th Cir. 1991) (woman's sexual harassment
claim under title VII must be evaluated under reasonable woman standard; sex-blind reason-
able person standard tends to be male-biased and to systematically ignore experience of wo-
men); State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548, 558-59 (Wash. 1977) (using reasonable woman standard
for self-defense in criminal cases); Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men:
The Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1210-14
(1990) (discussing symbolism of reasonable man standard).
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which that question is asked. The jury can consider what different peo-
ple consider acceptable, and why.
Should the issue of consent be interpreted on the basis of the infor-
mation that is available to the man, or the information that is available to
the woman? Evaluating the issue solely on the basis of the information
that is available to the woman would make rape a strict liability offense.
Not even a reasonable mistake would be a defense. There is only a subtle
difference between that standard and a negligence standard defined so
that only "yes means yes."
However, a fundamental purpose of the criminal law is to assess the
culpability as well as the dangerousness of the defendant. For that rea-
son, if a man is charged with rape, the issue of consent should be evalu-
ated on the basis of the information that was available to the man. That
does not entail adopting a "male standard" of behavior.
Are there any situations in which rape should be judged based on
the information that is available to the woman? Yes. If the woman is
charged with killing the man who allegedly raped her, the woman's cul-
pability and dangerousness would be at issue, not his. The fact that she
felt she had been raped would be relevant even if she were not legally
raped, as that crime is defined when a man is charged with rape. The
fact that she felt she had been raped could serve, for example, to reduce
murder to manslaughter, or to establish self-defense."' In a prosecution
of a man for rape, the government would have to prove beyond a reason-
able doubt that the man raped the woman. In a prosecution of the wo-
man, in many jurisdictions it would be enough for the defense to create a
reasonable doubt concerning rape.
11 4
In criminal cases, the defendant faces the loss of liberty, and the
stigma of being branded a felon. In contrast, in civil cases, the defendant
113. See, e.g., BENNETr & FELDMAN, supra note 36, at 179-80 (Joan Little acquitted of
killing jail guard who allegedly raped her); Elizabeth M. Schneider & Susan B. Jordan, Repre-
sentation of Women Who Defend Themselves in Response to Physical or Sexual Assault, 4 Wo-
MEN's RS. L. REP. 149, 160-63 (1978) (Inez Garcia acquitted of killing man who allegedly
helped rape her); cf. Garcia, supra note 67, at 1140 n.332 (mental states in criminal cases are
relevant to determine defendant's culpability, level of offense, mitigating circumstances, appro-
priate sentence and whether act was criminal).
114. Cf. Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987) (state must prove every element of offense
beyond reasonable doubt, but placing burden on defendant of proving self-defense by prepon-
derance of evidence does not violate due process); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977)
(placing burden on defendant of proving extreme emotional disturbance by preponderance of
evidence to reduce murder to manslaughter does not violate due process). Washington appar-
ently is the only state that shifts the burden of proof on a consent defense to the defendant
when a man is prosecuted for rape. See State v. Camara, 781 P.2d 483, 487 (Wash. 1989);
Berliner, supra note 105, at 2693 n.43.
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may be liable for money damages. In a tort suit by a woman against a
man for rape, the law could focus on the effect of the man's actions on
the woman, rather than on the man's intent or fault. The purpose of the
remedy would be to compensate the woman for her injuries. 115 Simi-
larly, sexual harassment law under title VII focuses on the effect of the
man's actions on the woman, rather than on the culpability of the man.
Liability under title VII is not based on fault.1 16 In civil cases, the wo-
man could prove a rape by a preponderance of the evidence. Thus, an
encounter may constitute a "rape" under civil law, but not under the
criminal law. These contrasting situations highlight the different values
that are at stake in civil and criminal cases, and the importance of evalu-
ating the culpability of the accused in a criminal case, whether the ac-
cused is a man or a woman.
Rape law traditionally does not define consent so that "yes means
yes." In fact, rape law traditionally does not define consent so that "no
means no." Simply getting the criminal law to recognize that "no means
no" is one goal of rape reform.1 17 Getting the criminal law to recognize
that only "yes means yes," and to abolish mistake as a defense, are goals
of radical feminists." 8 That is one difference between liberal feminism
and radical feminism. That is one difference between reform and
revolution.
115. See, eg., S. 15, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 301, 137 CONG. REC. S608, S610 (daily ed. Jan.
14, 1991) (proposed Violence Against Women Act would create civil cause of action for dam-
ages under federal law for crimes of violence motivated by victim's gender, including rape);
Ann Pelham & Garry Sturgess, Domestic Relations in Federal Court?, LEGAL TIMEs, Oct. 21,
1991, at 7 (Judicial Conference opposes proposed bill making federal case out of civil actions
for crimes of violence motivated by gender); see also Gail M. Ballou, Note, Recourse for Rape
Victims: Third Party Liability, 4 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 105 (1981) (advocating use of tort
remedies for purposes of providing compensation to rape victims and preventing future rapes);
Maja Hanks & Laurie Zimet, Liability for Rape, in WOMEN & L. (Carol H. Lefcourt ed.,
1984) (addressing legal issues which may arise in civil sexual assault suit); Camille LeGrand &
Frances Leonard, Civil Suits for Sexual Assault: Compensating Rape Victims, 8 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REv. 479, 491-513 (1979) (exploring various tort theories applicable to sexual
assault cases); Maureen Balleza, Many Rape Victims Finding Justice Through Civil Courts,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1991, at Al (examining cases where women have successfully filed civil
suit against rapists, rapists' employers or security companies responsible for maintaining
safety).
116. See, eg., Meritor Says. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63-69 (1986) ("hostile environ-
ment" sexual discrimination actionable under title VII); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878
(9th Cir. 1991) (sexual harassment claim must be evaluated from perspective of victim because
title VII is aimed at effects of employment practice and not at motivation of co-worker or
employer).
117. See, eg., Estrich, supra note 67, at 1127.
118. See infra notes 150-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of the perspectives of
radical feminists Catherine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin.
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.2. The use of force
What level of force is acceptable between men and women in bed?
In more basic terms, did the man make the woman have intercourse?
How much force is too much force? Was she afraid of him? Did he do
anything to scare her? If the woman did not consent, why is force
relevant?
What evidence is there on the use of force? The government witness
in the exercise testified that the man did not threaten to hurt the woman,
did not threaten to kill her, and did not threaten her in any way. The
defense witness testified that the man did not physically threaten or hurt
her, and although the man was not gentle, he was not forceful.
Using the language of the California statute as an example'19 and
focusing on the actions of the man: Did the man use force? Did he use
violence? He did not use physical force or violence in the sense of hitting
the woman. Did he cause fear of immediate bodily injury? Did he
threaten to inflict extreme pain or serious bodily injury? Is the fact that
she was crying, or the conflicting testimony on whether she was crying,
relevant? Did the man menace the woman? Menace is defined as "any
threat, declaration, or act which shows an intention to inflict an injury
upon another.""12 Did he use duress? Duress is defined as a "direct or
implied threat of force, violence, danger, hardship, or retribution suffi-
cient to coerce a reasonable person of ordinary susceptibilities."' 1 Did
119. CAL. PENAL CODE § 286(a) (West 1988 & Supp. 1992) (sodomy defined as "contact
between the penis of one person and the anus of another person"); id. § 286(c) (sodomy
"against the victim's will by means of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and
unlawful bodily injury... or by threatening to retaliate in the future" is punishable by three,
six or eight years in prison); id. § 261.6 (consent defined as "positive cooperation in act or
attitude pursuant to an exercise of free will. The person must act freely and voluntarily and
have knowledge of the nature of the act or transaction involved."); id. § 266c (West 1988)
(consent procured by false or fraudulent representation with intent to create fear of unlawful
physical injury or death); id. § 287 (West 1988 & Supp. 1992) ("Any sexual penetration, how-
ever slight, is sufficient to complete the crime of sodomy."); see also id. § 261(a)(2) (rape de-
fined as "sexual intercourse . . . accomplished against a person's will by means of force,
violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the person of
another"); id. § 261(a)(6) (threat to retaliate in future defined as "a threat to kidnap or falsely
imprison, or to inflict extreme pain, serious bodily injury, or death"); id. § 261(b) (duress
defined as "a direct or implied threat of force, violence, danger, hardship, or retribution suffi-
cient to coerce a reasonable person of ordinary susceptibilities"); id. § 261(c) (menace defined
as "any threat, declaration, or act which shows an intention to inflict an injury upon an-
other"); id. § 263 (West 1988) ("The essential guilt of rape consists in the outrage to the per-
son and the feelings of the victim of the rape. Any sexual penetration, however slight, is
sufficient to complete the crime."); id. § 264 (West 1988 & Supp. 1992) (rape punishable by
three, six or eight years).
120. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(c) (West 1988 & Supp. 1992).
121. Id. § 261(b).
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the man do any of those things?
Shifting to the actions of the woman: Was the woman subjectively
coerced by what the man did? Shifting to a socially reasonable standard:
Would a reasonable person of ordinary susceptibilities have been co-
erced? Is the reasonable person a man or a woman in this context? The
existence of duress is to be determined under the totality of circum-
stances.122 The fact that the person is a woman and not a man presuma-
bly should be taken into account in deciding what is impermissibly
coercive here. Should the inquiry be whether the man engaged in unrea-
sonable behavior to cause the woman to have intercourse? Are social
attitudes about sex and violence part of the totality of circumstances?
3. Penetration
The videotape shows circumstantial evidence of penetration. The
witnesses testified as to what they saw and heard concerning penetration.
However, there is no direct evidence of penetration. In Mailer's words,
"there has been no shot of Brando going up Schneider." 123 There was in
fact no penetration: the sex was simulated.
Penetration is an essential element that the government must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt. Radical feminists have attacked the empha-
sis on penetration in intercourse and in rape law. Penetration is problem-
atic for a number of reasons. The witnesses in the exercise were
embarrassed and reluctant to talk about whether they had actually seen
the man's penis penetrate the woman's anus. The lawyers were embar-
rassed to ask. The other students were embarrassed to hear the questions
and answers. A woman who has been raped may find it humiliating to
talk directly about penetration during the investigation and trial. The
government may feel that it is necessary to gather and offer additional
evidence of penetration, such as evidence of lacerations or sperm found
in the woman. Why is penetration the focus of intercourse and rape?
Would a woman be injured if a man achieved sexual contact but not
penetration? If she were, would it be enough to prosecute the man for
assault and battery? Should penetration be an essential element of the
crime of rape? Should sexual contact be enough, as it is in some rape
reform statutes? 24 It is one thing to read about these issues. It is some-
122. Id.
123. Mailer, supra note 19, at 203.
124. See, e.g., MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520a(k) (West 1991) (sexual contact defined
as intentional touching of victim's intimate parts if touching can reasonably be construed as
being for purpose of sexual arousal or gratification); id. § 750.520c(1)() (second-degree crimi-
nal sexual conduct when force or coercion used to achieve sexual contact and personal injury
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thing else to experience first hand some of the problems raised by the
penetration requirement, as the students did in the exercise.
On a less emotional level, the need to prove penetration illustrates
the relationship between "what really happened," the evidence, the ele-
ments of the offense and proof beyond a reasonable doubt; the process of
drawing inferences from the evidence to the ultimate issues; the differ-
ence between circumstantial evidence and direct evidence; the questions
relevant on direct examination to establish each element of the offense
beyond a reasonable doubt; and the questions relevant on cross-examina-
tion to create a reasonable doubt. This looks like penetration, but it is
not. The film clip makes it possible to grasp those issues at an experien-
tial level, rather than at an abstract intellectual level.
B. Rape Reform Legislation
Feminists and law enforcement interests have achieved substantial
and widespread changes in rape laws over the past fifteen years. 125 What
difference does rape reform make in this particular case? This section
will focus on the Michigan rape reform statute, 126 and on Susan Estrich's
proposals for further reform. 27
1. The Michigan statute
The Michigan statute is not a radical departure from the traditional
model of rape as intercourse through the use of force and without con-
sent. Whether the man in Last Tango is guilty remains problematic.
Under the Michigan statute, the crime is called criminal sexual conduct
(CSC) rather than rape. The statute defines criminal sexual conduct in
the first, second, third and fourth degrees.12 The essential inquiries
under the Michigan statute are four: (1) Did the man use force or coer-
cion? (2) Did the man cause personal injury to the victim? (3) Did the
man penetrate the woman? (4) Did the man have sexual contact with the
woman? In addition, although the statute does not make the lack of con-
results); id. § 750.520e(1)(a) (fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct when force or coercion
used to achieve sexual contact).
125. See Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Unfinished Business in Rape Law Reform, 48 J. Soc.
IssuEs (forthcoming May 1992; manuscript on file with author) (summarizing rape law re-
forms and research findings on impact of those reforms). Carole Goldberg-Ambrose concludes
that "we have insufficient and conflicting information about the difference these laws make for
victims, for the criminal justice system, and for the treatment of women generally." Id. at 23-
24.
126. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.520a-m.
127. See infra notes 139-48 and accompanying text.
128. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.520b-e.
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sent an element of criminal sexual conduct, the courts have recognized
consent as a defense under the statute.
129
Did the man use an unacceptable level of force or coercion in the
scene from Last Tango? Arguably not. The man did not engage in the
behavior that is expressly forbidden under the statute. The man proba-
bly did not "overcome" the woman through the use of physical force or
physical violence. 130 He did not threaten to use force or violence."' He
did not threaten to punish, kidnap or extort the woman.' 32 He did not
overcome the woman through concealment or surprise. 33 He was not
armed with a weapon.' 34 Although force or coercion is not limited to
those enumerated circumstances, 35 it is not clear what actions by the
man would constitute force or coercion.
Did the man cause personal injury to the woman? Mental anguish
constitutes personal injury under the statute.1 36 Arguably, the fact that
the woman cried would support an inference that she suffered mental
anguish-but whether she cried was the subject of conflicting testimony.
Did the man achieve penetration or sexual contact? Sexual contact is
defined as the intentional touching of the victim's intimate parts if that
touching can reasonably be construed as being for the purpose of sexual
arousal or gratification. 37 The man appeared to be sexually aroused and
gratified: he appeared to have an orgasm (although that was simulated,
like the penetration). Whether the man in Last Tango used force or coer-
cion, whether the woman consented, how consent is defined, and there-
fore whether the man is guilty of a crime remains problematic under the
Michigan statute.' 38 Does that mean the man should not be guilty of
rape, or does that mean the Michigan reforms did not go far enough?
129. See People v. Thompson, 324 N.W.2d 22 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982); People v. Hearn, 300
N.W.2d 396 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980).
130. MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 750.520b(l)(f)(i).
131. Id. § 750.520b(1)(f)(ii).
132. Id. § 750.520b(1)(f)(iii).
133. Id. § 750.520b(l)(f)(v).
134. Ie § 750.520b(l)(e).
135. See id. §§ 750.520b(1)(f), .520c(1)(f), .520d(1)(b), .520e(1)(a).
136. Id § 750.520a(j).
137. Id. § 750.520a(k).
138. If the man caused personal injury to the woman and he used force or coercion to
achieve penetration, that constitutes CSC in the first degree. Id. § 750.520b(1)(f. If the man
caused personal injury to the woman and he used force or coercion to achieve sexual contact,
that constitutes CSC in the second degree. Id. § 750.520c(l)(f). Even if the man did not cause
personal injury to the woman, he could be guilty of CSC in the third degree if he achieved
penetration through force or coercion, id. § 750.520d(1)(b), or CSC in the fourth degree (a
misdemeanor) if he achieved sexual contact through force or coercion, id. § 750.520e(1)(a).
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2. "Real rape"
Susan Estrich criticizes extensively the reasoning of traditional rape
cases and the wording of rape reform statutes, and describes some pro-
posals for further reform.139 According to Estrich, consent should be
defined so that "no means no."'" Criminal negligence regarding consent
should be enough to establish criminal liability for rape.14' Negligence
means ignoring a woman's words. 42 Reasonable men know that "no
means no." Society has not yet reached a point where consent should be
defined so that "yes means yes," so that the woman must affirmatively
consent to the act actually engaged in. 13 Unlike radical feminists, Es-
trich is not willing to use the criminal law to lead society to that point.
In addition, the force or coercion that negates consent should be defined
to include extortion and deception. 1" The law of ripe should prohibit
exactly the same threats as the law of extortion, and the same deceptions
as the law of false pretenses or fraud.'45 That is Estrich's "easy answer"
to difficult hypotheticals: resolve the question as if money were in-
volved.'" "Real rape" includes nontraditional rapes where the woman
says "no," or submits only in response to lies or threats that would be
prohibited if the man were seeking money.' 47
What did "no" mean in the scene, based on the witnesses' testi-
mony? Based on the videotape? If the man in the scene reached into the
woman's pants and took some cash, would that be theft by extortion or
deception? I think not.'48 I think therefore that the man did not rape
139. Estrich, supra note 67, at 1102-05, 1117-21, 1147-57, 1179-84; see also SusAN Es-
TRICH, REAL RAPE 92-104 (1987) [hereinafter ESTRICH, REAL RAPE].
140. Estrich, supra note 67, at 1182.
141. Id. at 1182-83.
142. See id.
143. Id. at 1182.
144. See id. at 1183.
145. Id. at 1182.
146. Id. at 1182 n.334.
147. See ESTmiCH, REAL RAPE, supra note 139, at 102-04 (summarizing her views of what
constitutes "real rape").
148. The man did not create, reinforce or fail to correct any false impressions, fail to dis-
close any relevant information, or prevent the woman from acquiring any information. See
MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.3 (1980) (theft by deception). The man did not make any threat
of bodily injury, accusation, exposure, official action, lawsuit or other harm that would not
benefit the man. See id. § 223.4 (theft by extortion). As an Assistant United States Attorney,
I served in the Public Corruption Unit, and investigated and prosecuted extortion and bribery
cases. I would not prosecute the man for theft by extortion or deception. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 201
(1989) (bribery); id. § 872 (extortion); id. § 873 (blackmail); id. §§ 1961-1963 (racketeering
influenced corrupt organizations); id. § 1961(1) (extortion); Robert Garcia, RICO and the
Constitution, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 417 (Leonard W. Levy et
al. eds., Supp. 11992).
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the woman. Under Estrich's self-proclaimed easy approach to hard
questions, the scene may not depict a "real rape." 149 Is that approach
satisfactory? Does the act of taking money from a woman by a man
occupy the same role in society that intercourse does? Where does Es-
trich's approach leave women who feel raped, but who do not fit within
her construct of "real rape"?
C. Radical Feminists
Radical feminists Catherine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin ad-
dress the significance of sex and violence in the context of power, ine-
quality, domination and subordination based on gender. 150  For
MacKinnon, sexuality is socially created under conditions of male power
and gender inequality." The sexuality of male dominance and female
subordination is defined by men and forced on women, and defines the
meaning of gender. 52 Sexuality becomes centered on penetration and
ejaculation."3 Domination and submission are eroticized. Men are so-
cialized to be sexually aggressive, and women to be passively receptive.'1
4
The objectification of women-defining women as things for sexual use
by men-becomes fundamental to the meaning of sex.155 It can be diffi-
cult to distinguish between sex, rape and violence in specific cases be-
cause many women experience everyday sex as violence under conditions
of male supremacy. 156 Feminist theory addresses that situation in order
to change it.1
57
According to MacKinnon, rape law fails to expose this underlying
social structure of male dominance.' 58 Rape and the meaning of a sexual
encounter are defined from a male perspective. 59 The issues of force and
consent are analyzed as if the woman exercised freedom of choice under
conditions of equality. The consent standard requires only passive con-
sent, and there need not even be actual consent or nonconsent. 160 Mis-
149. See Estrich, supra note 67, at 1182 n.334; ESTRICH, REAL RAPE, supra note 139, at
102-04.
150. DWORKIN, supra note 21, at 121-43; CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMI-
NIST THEORY OF THE STATE 126-54, 171-83 (1989).
151. MACKINNON, supra note 150, at 127-33.
152. Ia at 128-29, 131, 137.
153. Id. at 133, 172.
154. Id. at 135, 177-78.
155. Id. at 140-41.
156. Id. at 146, 174, 177.
157. Id. at 128.
158. Id. at 174-75.
159. Id. at 150, 180-83.
160. Id. at 149, 150, 174-78.
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take measured from a male perspective is a defense."'
Measuring consent under a socially reasonable standard can perpet-
uate male domination if the perspective of women is ignored. 62 One
must recognize that socially reasonable behavior is itself socially created
under conditions of gender inequality.163 One must ask to whom the
conduct is reasonable, and why." "What really happened" does not
objectively exist, or cannot be objectively determined. 165 There are only
interpretations of what happened, and those interpretations are shaped
under conditions of gender inequality.1 66 The different interpretations of
the scene from Last Tango illustrate these points.
MacKinnon would inquire into the meaning of the encounter from a
woman's point of view. 67 From MacKinnon's perspective, rape is an act
of subordination of women to men that expresses and reinforces women's
inequality. 168
It is not clear what follows from MacKinnon's statement of the
problem. One possibility is that the crime of rape would be defined as
any act of intercourse by the man that subordinates the woman and ex-
presses and reinforces her inequality. Mistake would not be a defense.
The feelings of the woman, or perhaps of a "reasonable woman," could
be relevant in defining the crime: Did the man do anything to make the
woman feel subordinated, unequal and raped? Did she feel raped?
Would a reasonable woman in the victim's situation feel subordinated,
unequal and raped? Under such an approach, arguably the man raped
the woman in the scene from Last Tango.
MacKinnon, however, does not seem to go that far. Instead, she
maintains that rape should be defined as sex through compulsion
(whatever that means). 169 Lack of consent should not be a separate ele-
ment of the crime because it is redundant. 70 Mistake concerning con-
sent should not be recognized as a defense, because it takes the male
point of view on sex and violence. 71 Whether the man compelled the
woman to have intercourse in the scene remains problematic: what evi-
161. Id. at 181-83, 245.
162. Id. at 180-81.
163. Id. at 183.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 180-83.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 182.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 245.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 245-46.
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dence is there that the man used compulsion? MacKinnon's insights re-
garding power, context and interpretation nevertheless are powerful tools
for understanding sex and violence.
For Dworkin, rape is also about power and male dominance.
172
Rape is not just the abuse of women through violence, threats or fear.
Rape is simultaneously an abuse and a normal use of women under con-
ditions of male domination. 173 Women are socialized to become objects
of male sexual desire, to become "the thing he wants to fuck." 174 Sex is
defined by what men want: intercourse as penetration and occupation of
subordinated women. 17 Consent in this context is meaningless.
1 76
Is all intercourse rape? No. Dworkin leaves open the possibility
that intercourse could be an experience of equality, passion, sensuality
and intimacy if the woman controlled each and every act of sex, if the
woman initiated sex, and if the woman were the final authority on what
the sex would be.177 Intercourse could take place under conditions of
freedom, dignity and self-determination if penetration were just one pos-
sible sex act among many entered into by equals as part of other, deeper,
longer, more sensual lovemaking; or if the social structure reflected the
low value of penetration in the sexual pleasure of some women like
Dworkin; or if new technologies freed intercourse from reproduction.1 78
Dworkin's standard goes far beyond "no means no." The goal of
rape reform is to stop the sexual abuse of women. The goal of radical
feminism is to stop the normal use and abuse of women as sex objects
under conditions of male domination. Dworkin's standard opens up new
lines of relevant inquiries into the scene from Last Tango. The woman
did not initiate the act of intercourse, she did not control that act, and
she was not the final authority on what the act would be or was. The act
did not take place under Dworkin's ideal conditions of love, equality and
control. Does that mean the man raped the woman?
What's love got to do with it? Do only women want the kind of love
that Dworkin seeks? Many people-men and women-seek that kind of
love. Do all women want that kind of love? Does everybody want that
kind of love every time they have sex? Many people are not prepared to
classify the failure to make love as rape. Many people are not prepared
172. DWORKIN, supra note 21, at 121-43.
173. Id. at 122, 125.
174. Id. at 140.
175. Id. at 123-24.
176. Id. at 129.
177. Id. at 135-36.
178. Id. at 138-39.
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to use the criminal law to force individuals to live up to the highest stan-
dards of virtue in this society.
Nevertheless, Dworkin's and MacKinnon's seemingly radical views
cannot be dismissed as simply utopian, repressive or man-hating. Dwor-
kin, like MacKinnon, illuminates the injury of rape to a woman's human-
ity, equality and self-determination. In a humane sexuality, men and
women would treat each other with mutual respect and dignity.
The criminal law is not the only tool for achieving social change.
Other tools are available to impose standards of behavior that currently
fall below criminal negligence. Campaigns to educate the public could
go beyond redefining consent so that "no means no." Civil suits for dam-
ages, rather than the criminal sanction, could also be used to begin to
change people's attitudes about sex and violence. Women could act col-
lectively to change the conditions under which they have sex179 -- and
men could join them. Perhaps in those ways a humane sexuality will be
incorporated over time into what society considers acceptable behavior
between men and women in bed, and into the standard of criminal
negligence.
IV. CONCLUSION
Did the man rape the woman?
179. See Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEx. L.
REv. 387, 432 & n.206 (1984) (suggesting sex strike by women to change social conditions of
sexuality).
April 1992]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
APPENDIX
The following is a transcript of the scene from Last Tango in Paris:"°
WOMAN: Tu es la?
Nobody here? 1l y a personne?
Hi, monster. Salut, monstre.
Something wrong? Ca va pas? Tu as des
problemes, hmm?
MAN: There's some butter in the kitchen.
WOMAN: So you're here. Why didn't you answer?
MAN: Go get the butter.
WOMAN: I have to hurry. I have a cab downstairs waiting.
MAN: Go get the butter.
WOMAN: It makes me crazy, that you're so damn sure that I'm
coming back here.
What do you think? Qu'es ce que tu crois, toi?
That an American on the Qu'un Americain, assis par
floor terre,
in an empty house... dans un apartement vide,
eating cheese a manger du fromage et a
and drinking water boire de l'eau,
... is interesting? tu crois que c'est
What's under here?
MAN:
WOMAN:
MAN:
WOMAN:
in
II.
de.,
An empty space. Tu
Can your hear it? via
It's hollow.
Yeah. Maybe it's a hiding place.
Don't open it.
Why not?
I don't know. Don't open it.
eressant?
y a quelque chose la-
SSOUS.
entends? Ily a un
180. The following is a fair and accurate transcript of the dialogue in a home video version
of Last Tango. The dialogue in the video and in this transcript is different from the dialogue in
the published screenplay. In addition, some of the stage directions and other descriptions in
the screenplay are inconsistent with the video. The screenplay thus represents yet another
interpretation of the scene. See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text; BERTOLUCCl &
ARCALLI, supra note 8, at 128-33. The author's secretary, Jean-Paul Dervaux, a native French
speaker, transcribed the scene and compared this transcript to the video. The translation from
the French appears in subtitles in the film.
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MAN:
WOMAN:
MAN:
WOMAN:
MAN:
WOMAN:
MAN:
WOMAN:
MAN:
WOMAN:
MAN:
WOMAN:
MAN:
WOMAN:
MAN:
WOMAN:
MAN:
WOMAN:
MAN:
WOMAN:
MAN:
WOMAN:
MAN:
WOMAN:
MAN:
WOMAN:
What about that? Can I open that? Hm? Wait a minute.
Maybe there's jewels in it. Maybe there's gold. You
afraid?
No.
No? You're always afraid.
No but, maybe there is some family secrets inside.
Family secrets? I'll tell you about family secrets.
Qu'es ce que tu fais?
I'm going to tell you about the family. A holy institution,
meant to bring virtue in savages. I want you to repeat it
after me.
No, no. No.
Repeat it. Say it. Holy family. Come on, say it. Go on.
Holy family, church of good citizens.
Church. Chu-
Good citizens.
Good citizens. Aahh.
Say it. Say it. The children are tortured until they tell
their first lie.
The children are tortured... Aahh.
And the will is broken by repression.
And the will is broken [unintelligible].
With freedom.
With freedom.
Is ...
Freedom.
Is assassinated. The freedom is assassinated by
[unintelligible].
[Unintelligible].
Fa-, family.
Family.
You. You. You. You f-. You fucking. You fucking
family. Ahh. You fucking family. Oh, god. Jesus. Oh
you. Oh. Oh, god. Aahh.
Eh, merde.
A, you. Yes, you.
Huh?MAN:
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WOMAN: I've got a surprise for you.
MAN: What?
WOMAN: I've got a surprise for you.
MAN: That's good. I like surprises. What is it?
WOMAN: Music, but I don't know how to work it.
MAN: Did you enjoy that?
